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“Coordinating” with the Federal Government:
Assessing County Efforts to Control Decisionmaking on Public
Lands
Michael C. Blumm*
James A. Fraser**
Resentment of the federal government’s management of public lands
runs deep in the arid West, where grazing, mining, and timber once
predominated and remain important to rural communities. This
resentment bubbled over in 2016 with the armed occupation of the
Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in eastern Oregon and the ensuing
acquittal of the occupants of criminal wrongdoing. Less violent
manifestations of dissatisfaction in the rural West are playing out in the
enactment of county land use ordinances that attempt to gain control
over federal land management. These ordinances, encouraged by interest
groups such as the American Legislative Exchange Council and the
American Stewards of Liberty, raise serious questions about the
relationship between federal and local government in federal land
planning.
In this article, we examine an archetypical county ordinance from Baker
County, Oregon and explain that most of its provisions are preempted by
federal law and, therefore, unenforceable. Although statutes like the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act and the National Forest
Management Act encourage cooperation between local governments and
federal land planners, they do not authorize local land-use control on
public lands. Thirty years ago, in the leading decision of Granite Rock v.
California Coastal Commission, the United States Supreme Court drew a
sharp distinction between permissible state and local environmental
regulation and impermissible land use planning, a distinction that lower
courts have maintained over the years.
Ordinances like Baker County’s, which are proliferating throughout the
rural West, fail to observe the distinction drawn by the Court, and
consequently include numerous local land use directives that are
preempted by federal law. Although we believe that local involvement
*
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can help to improve federal land planning, we show how and why local
ordinances attempting to prescribe land uses on federal public lands
conflict with federal law, and mislead their supporters into believing the
plans are enforceable.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the arid West, many politicians and local governments resent
the federal government for its public land ownership and management.
The Sagebrush Rebellion in the 1970s 1 and the County Supremacy
movement in the 1990s 2 reflected this hostility towards federal agencies.
1.
The Sagebrush Rebellion was largely a reaction to the enactment of
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-576, 90 Stat.
2728 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787 (2012)). During the rebellion, several
states—including Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah—enacted laws asserting
state control over public lands. See Robert Fischman & Jeremiah Williamson, The
Story of Kleppe v. New Mexico: The Sagebrush Rebellion as Un-Cooperative
Federalism, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 123, 158 (2011) (“The Sagebrush Rebellion began
as narrowly focused rancher frustration with the [Wild Free-Roaming Horses and
Burros Act of 1971], and in less than half a decade grew to encompass a wide array
of public land conflicts. Nevada . . . led the movement for greater state control of
public lands, advancing a regional political agenda.”). The rebellion came shortly
after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Kleppe v. New Mexico that Congress may
preempt state laws to protect wildlife on public lands. 426 U.S. 529, 546 (1976).
2.
The County Supremacy movement was a period in the early 1990s
when “approximately thirty-five counties adopted ordinances asserting authority
over federal lands.” Elizabeth Osenbaugh & Nancy Stoner, The County Supremacy
Movement, 28 URB. LAW. 497, 498 (1996); see also Boundary Backpackers v.
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On January 2, 2016, the issue grabbed national news headlines when
militants took control of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in
southeastern Oregon. 3 These radicals—heavily armed and wearing
cowboy hats—seized the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service-managed land in
protest of federal regulation of grazing permits for environmental
purposes, as well as the prosecution, conviction, and sentencing of two
Oregon ranchers for setting fire to federal public lands.4
Although much national attention concerning local control over
public lands focused on the “Malheur Occupation,” western counties are
quietly passing ordinances that assert a government-to-government role
in managing public lands alongside federal agencies.5 The counties rely
on provisions in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(“FLPMA”) 6 and the National Forest Management Act of 1976
(“NFMA”)7 that direct federal agencies to “coordinate” with state and
Boundary Cnty., 913 P.2d 1141, 1143 (Idaho 1995) (county ordinance that required
federal government to comply with county land use plan was preempted and
therefore invalid); Scott Reed, The County Supremacy Movement: Mendacious Myth
Marketing, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 525, 527 (1994) (“The county supremacy movement is
a new version of the Sagebrush Rebellion, which in turn was simply another spin on
how to place the public lands under control of the private commercial users.”).
3.
See, e.g., Les Zaitz, Militia Takes Over Malheur National Wildlife
Refuge Headquarters, THE OREGONIAN (Jan. 2, 2016), http://www.oregonlive.com/
pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2016/01/drama_in_burns_ends_with_quiet.html;
Kirk Johnson & Jack Healy, Armed Group Vows to Continue Occupation at Oregon
Refuge, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/us/armedgroup-vows-to-hold-federal-wildlife-office-in-oregon-for-years.html.
4.
See Kirk Johnson & Jack Healy, Protestors in Oregon Seek to End
Policy That Shaped West, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/01/06/us/protesters-seek-to-end-policy-that-shaped-west.html; see also Greg
Walden, Congressman, 2nd District of Oregon, Address to the U.S. House of
Representatives (Jan. 5, 2016), transcript available at https://walden.house.gov/
speech (reviewing the prosecution of ranchers Dwight and Steve Hammond and
discussing the rancor between livestock producers and the federal government in
eastern Oregon).
5.
See Amanda Peacher, Counties Turn to Little-Known Policy to
Boost Say in Federal Land Management, OREGON PUBLIC BROADCASTING (Apr. 4,
2016), http://www.opb.org/news/series/burns-oregon-standoff-bundy-militia-newsupdates/federal-land-management-oregon-counties/.
6.
43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (2012) (in developing and revising federal
land plans, the Secretary shall “to the extent consistent with the laws governing the
administration of the public lands, coordinate the land use inventory, planning, and
management activities of or for such lands with the land use planning and
management programs of other Federal departments and agencies and of the States
and local governments within which the lands are located.”) (emphasis added).
7.
16 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2012) (“[T]he Secretary of Agriculture shall
develop, maintain, and, as appropriate, revise land and resource management plans
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local governments in the land planning process. 8 These local
“coordination” ordinances, usually in the form of a “natural resources
plan,” aim to impose county policies on federal land managers by
demanding they conform to county positions.9 This Article examines the
authority of such ordinances and contends that in most instances county
directives are preempted by federal law and unenforceable under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, 10 and case law
including California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co.11
Rural western communities have been dissatisfied with federal
land management decisions, blaming environmental regulation, litigious
advocacy groups, and recreational users of public lands for stifling local
economies long dependent on ranching, logging, and mining. In 2012,
the Utah legislature passed the Utah Transfer of Public Lands Act,
demanding that the federal government cede public lands in Utah to the
State by 2014,12 notwithstanding the fact that studies have consistently
for units of the National Forest System, coordinated with the land and resource
management planning processes of State and local governments and other Federal
agencies.”) (emphasis added).
8.
See Peacher, supra note 5 (“Baker and Malheur Counties [Oregon]
already adopted natural resource plans under the coordination premise. Efforts are
underway in at least four other [Oregon] counties to do the same. Their idea is that
if local governments set out their priorities and vision for public lands, then federal
agencies have to adjust management practices to align with their plan.”).
9.
See, e.g., BAKER COUNTY, OREGON, NATURAL RESOURCES PLAN 23
(July 20, 2016) [hereinafter BAKER COUNTY PLAN] (“Federal and State agencies
shall not encourage the relinquishment of, nor allow the retirement of, grazing
permits on designated grazing lands (i.e. grazing districts) for uses that exclude
substantive livestock grazing.”); id. at 27 (“On public lands, all tree mortality caused
by forest fire and pests shall be harvested before additional loss of economic value
occurs, in coordination with the Baker County Board of Commissioners.”).
10.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
11.
California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 594
(1987) (deciding that states may require environmental protection measures for uses
of federal public lands, but federal land planning preempts state and local planning).
12.
H.R. 148, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Utah 2012); see Nick Lawton,
Utah’s Transfer of Public Lands Act: Demanding a Gift of Federal Lands, 16 VT. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 15 (2014) (“Although the TPLA requires the U.S. to convey lands to
Utah, it does not require the state to pay fair market value—or any value at all. The
TPLA simply requires Congress to ‘extinguish title’ to the lands and ‘transfer title’
to the state.”); see also PETER MICHAEL ET AL., REPORT OF THE PUBLIC LANDS
SUBCOMMITTEE (Conference of Western Attorneys General, 2016) (examining legal
issues of federal land ownership in the West, and adopting by 11-1 vote the Paper’s
conclusions that states have scant legal authority to demand transfer of public lands);
ROBERT B. KEITER & JOHN C. RUPLE, A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSFER OF
PUBLIC LANDS ACT 6 (Univ. of Utah, Wallace Stegner Ctr. for Land, Resources &
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shown state governments do not have the budgetary or administrative
resources to manage the public land acreage. 13 At the federal level,
Utah’s representatives support legislation that would limit the federal
government’s ability to manage public lands in Utah.14 Unsurprisingly,
many public lands users, like hunters and anglers, are vehemently
opposed to proposals that would “defederalize” public lands or “transfer”
public lands to the states.15
Env’t, 2014) (“Statutes authorizing Western states to join the Union required those
same states to disclaim the right to additional lands and that disclaimer cannot be
spun into a federal duty to dispose. Statehood enabling acts’ guarantee of equal
political rights also cannot be spun into a promise of equal land ownership.
Furthermore, though statehood enabling acts guarantee states a share of the proceeds
resulting from federal land sales, that guarantee is not an obligation to sell.”).
13.
See, e.g., ELISE STAMBRO ET AL., AN ANALYSIS OF A TRANSFER OF
FEDERAL LANDS TO THE STATE OF UTAH 123 (Univ. of Utah, Bureau of Econ. & Bus.
Research 2014), available at http://publiclands.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/
11/1.%20Land%20Transfer%20Analysis%20Final%20Report.pdf (estimating that
Utah would have to generate $280 million annually to cover the management costs
of transferred public lands); JAY O’LAUGHLIN, WOULD A TRANSFER OF FEDERAL
LANDS TO THE STATE OF IDAHO MAKE OR LOSE MONEY? (Univ. of Idaho, Policy
Analysis Group, 2014), available at http://posting.boiseweekly.com/media/pdf/pagib16_federal-land-transfer__1_.pdf (estimating that transfer would cost Idaho up to
$111 million annually); CTR. FOR WESTERN PRIORITIES, THE MINING BURDEN:
STATES WOULD SHOULDER SIGNIFICANT COSTS OF CLEANING UP ABANDONED MINES
IF THEY TAKE OVER AMERICAN LANDS 2 (2015) (“We estimate that should state land
takeover efforts move forward, 13 Western states would be saddled with between
$9.6 and $21 billion in costs of cleaning up the approximately 100,000 abandoned
mines that exist on public lands today.”) (emphasis omitted).
14.
See, e.g., Utah National Monument Parity Act, S. 3317, 114th
Cong. (2016) (proposing to prohibit Presidents from designating national
monuments in Utah); Local Enforcement for Local Lands Act of 2016, H.R. 4751,
114th Cong. (2016) (proposing to terminate the Forest Service and BLM’s law
enforcement functions on public lands); Greater Sage Grouse Protection and
Recovery Act, H.R. 4739, 114th Cong. (2016) (proposing to require that federal sage
grouse recovery plans be consistent with state plans).
15.
According to knowledgeable commentators, state ownership of
federal lands—and the concomitant obligations requiring maximized revenue
generation on state lands—would adversely affect:
access to the transferred lands. Increased mineral development
would displace other users, and land managers would likely
increase access fees. In Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah,
and Wyoming, upwards of 75-percent of hunters utilize public
lands. In Colorado, Idaho, and Oregon, the figure is 54-, 66-, and
67-percent, respectively. Access to state trust land is already
costly, and it foreshadows additional costs if the transferred lands
are managed with an eye towards market efficiency. During 2014,
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As the push for transfer of public lands plays out at the state and
federal levels, several organizations have encouraged county
governments to pass ordinances or plans that invoke coordination with
the federal government. For example, the American Legislative
Exchange Council (“ALEC”), a group backed by the Charles and David
Koch,16 hosts a website with model legislation including “An Ordinance

the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources paid $703,550 to [The
Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration] ‘to
provide compensation to Utah’s school and institutional trust
beneficiaries for public access to school and institutional trust
lands for hunting, fishing, trapping, and viewing of wildlife.’ In
addition to Utah, state trust land managers in Colorado, Montana,
Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas all required some
form of payment to hunt, fish, or camp on state trust lands.
Arizona, Washington State, Louisiana, and Minnesota also
impose recreation user fees.
ROBERT B. KEITER & JOHN C. RUPLE, THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC LANDS MOVEMENT:
TAKING THE ‘PUBLIC’ OUT OF PUBLIC LANDS 5 (Univ. of Utah, Wallace Stegner Ctr.
for Land, Resources & Env’t, 2015); see also Jason Blevins, Sportsmen,
Conservationists Want Answers From Candidates on Public Land Transfers, THE
DENVER POST (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/09/21/sportsmenconservationists-candidates-reject-public-lands-transfer/ (“Sportsmen tend to think
that a large-scale transfer of federal lands to states would throttle their access to
prime playgrounds.”); Jamie Williams, You Can’t ‘Take Back’ Public Lands. They
Already Belong to All of Us, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/01/25/you-cant-take-back-publiclands-they-already-belong-to-all-of-us/ (president of the Wilderness Society arguing
for retained federal ownership of public lands); COLORADO COLLEGE, 2016
CONSERVATION IN THE WEST POLL (State of The Rockies Project, 2016), available at
https://www.coloradocollege.edu/other/stateoftherockies/conservationinthewest/
(majority of voters in Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming oppose disposal of public lands); Trout Unlimited, Our Public Lands Are
Not For Sale, TU.ORG, http://www.tu.org/public-lands-action (last visited May 4,
2017) (“Sportsmen and women know that public lands provide access to some of the
best hunting and fishing in their states—and these wild lands also help ensure the
health of fisheries and wildlife habitat downstream.”).
16.
See Lisa Graves, ALEC Exposed: The Koch Connection, THE
NATION (July 12, 2011), https://www.thenation.com/article/alec-exposed-kochconnection/ (“Hundreds of ALEC’s model bills and resolutions bear traces of Koch
DNA: raw ideas that were once at the fringes but that have been carved into
‘mainstream’ policy through the wealth and will of Charles and David Koch.”);
Nancy Scola, Exposing ALEC: How Conservative-Backed State Laws Are All
Connected, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2012/04/exposing-alec-how-conservative-backed-state-laws-are-allconnected/255869/.
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for Local Coordination on Federal Regulations.” 17 The American
Stewards of Liberty (“American Stewards”), is a Texas-based 18
organization directed by the daughter of late Nevada rancher, Wayne
Hage. 19 The group provides guidance on coordination including inperson courses on the coordination process 20 and free lessons on how
county commissioners might use coordination to incorporate their
17.
American Legislative Exchange Council, An Ordinance for Local
Coordination on Federal Regulations, ALEC.ORG, https://www.alec.org/modelpolicy/an-ordinance-for-local-coordination-on-federal-regulations/ (last visited Sept.
24, 2016). One might reasonably suspect that ALEC hopes to make coordination
ordinances more common in effort to make coordination and transfer policies more
mainstream. See Scola, supra note 16 (“Adopted first in the states, by the time these
laws bubble up to the national level, they’re the conventional wisdom on policy.”).
18.
The federal government owns only 1.8% of the land in Texas.
CAROL VINCENT ET AL., FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA
(Congressional Research Service 2014), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/R42346.pdf. The fact that American Stewards of Liberty is based in Texas
suggests the organization’s hostility to the notion of any federal land ownership at
all. American Stewards of Liberty, AMERICANSTEWARDS.US, https://www.american
stewards.us/about/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2016).
19.
The Executive Director of American Stewards of Liberty, Margaret
Byfield, “became actively involved in the property rights movement after her
parents, Wayne and Jean Hage, filed Hage v. United States in the Federal Court of
Claims—a court battle that began in 1991 resulting in the most significant Fifth
Amendment victory for property owners in the past two decades.” American
Stewards of Liberty, AMERICANSTEWARDS.US, https://www.americanstewards.us/
about/directors/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2016). Indeed, the Court of Federal Claims
ruled that the federal government had taken Hage’s water rights on federal land
without just compensation in Estate of Hage v. United States. 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 211–
13 (2008). However, the Federal Circuit reversed that ruling in 2012. Estate of
Hage v. United States, 687 F.3d 1281, 1287–91 (2012). Moreover, in related
litigation the Ninth Circuit recently ruled that the Hage family held no federal
easement for their cattle to cross federal lands and that their water rights do not
include an appurtenant right to graze public lands. United States v. Hage, 810 F.3d
712, 718–20 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 332 (2016). The Ninth Circuit
took the additional, extraordinary step of removing federal district Judge Robert C.
Jones from the Hage case due to his bias and prejudice in favor of the Hage family.
Id. at 723. On remand, the Nevada district court ordered the Hage family to pay
$587,294.28 for their illegal grazing, and “forever enjoined and restrained” them
from ever placing cattle on public lands in Nevada without authorization. United
States v. Hage, No. 2:07-cv-01154, 2017 WL 752832, at *7 (D. Nev. Feb. 27, 2017),
appeal filed, Mar. 9, 2017. These rulings quash the premise in Wayne Hage’s book,
where he argued that grazing permittees hold property interests in the form of “range
rights.” See generally WAYNE HAGE, STORM OVER RANGELANDS: PRIVATE RIGHTS
IN FEDERAL LANDS 1–23 (1994).
20.
American Stewards of Liberty, Training, AMERICANSTEWARDS.US,
https://www.americanstewards.us/programs/training/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2016).
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demands into federal land plans.21 Similarly, the Public Lands Council
urges county governments to invoke coordination, describing the process
in its “Beginner’s Guide to Coordination” as “a negotiation on a
government-to-government basis that seeks to ensure officially approved
local plans and policies are accommodated by planning and management
decisions on federal lands.” 22 These groups encourage county
commissioners to adopt statutory interpretations of their authority to
influence federal land management that have little basis in federal law.
County governments asserting novel interpretations of their role
in federal land management face a steep uphill legal battle because the
Property Clause of the United States Constitution gives the federal
government plenary authority in managing its land.23 As long ago as
1840, the Supreme Court of the United States declared that Congress’s
power to manage public lands under the Property Clause is “without
limitation.”24 Numerous ensuing decisions consistently reaffirmed that
federal land agencies have enormous discretion in making federal land
management decisions.25

21.
American Stewards of Liberty, Coordination, AMERICANSTEWARDS.
https://www.americanstewards.us/programs/coordination/ (last visited Sept. 25,
2016).
22.
ANDREA RIEBER, A BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO COORDINATION 5 (Public
Lands Council 2012).
23.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
24.
United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526, 537 (1840).
25.
See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314, 1318 (1997)
(“The United States . . . was not required to hold the public lands in Nevada in trust
for the establishment of future states. Rather, under the Property Clause, the United
States can administer its federal lands any way it chooses.”); Kleppe v. New Mexico,
426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976) (“Absent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains
jurisdiction over federal lands within its territory, but Congress equally surely retains
the power to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant the Property Clause.”);
Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928) (federal government may kill wildlife
on public lands to reduce grazing pressure, notwithstanding state hunting laws to the
contrary); Utah Power & Light v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 389–90 (1917)
(“[T]he inclusion within a state of lands of the United States does not take from
Congress the power to control their occupancy and use, to protect them from trespass
and injury, and to prescribe the conditions upon which others may obtain rights in
them, even though this may involve the exercise in some measure of what commonly
is known as the police power.”); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911)
(“The United States can prohibit absolutely or fix the terms on which its property
may be used.”); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524–26 (1897) (the federal
government may act as both a proprietor and a sovereign in protecting its property).
US,
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Historically, states and local governments rarely passed
coordination laws.26 But like targets in a “whack-a-mole” game, these
ordinances are now emerging across the West, with counties in Oregon,27
Washington, 28 and Wyoming 29 considering such legislation. For
example, the county board of commissioners in Baker County, Oregon
adopted a “Natural Resources Plan” in 2015, which attempts to require
federal agencies to coordinate with the county government on nearly
every aspect of public land use, including road closures, grazing permit
changes, wilderness area designations, fire suppression, and designation
of national monuments. 30 Other rural Oregon counties are in various
stages of enacting substantially similar coordination ordinances.31 Many
of these ordinances share the presumption that federal agencies must
maximize resource production on federal land to stimulate local
economies and value for local residents.32 The legal literature has yet to
address the phenomena of coordination ordinances and assess their
validity. However, with the beginning of President Donald J. Trump’s
26.
See, e.g., S. 117, 62nd Leg. (Mont. 2011) (statute that would have
required local governments to demand coordination from federal agencies before
agencies implemented federal plans within county boundaries).
27.
See Peacher, supra note 5.
28.
See Pend Oreille County, Natural Resources Committee,
PENDOREILLECO.ORG, http://pendoreilleco.org/your-government/community-develop
ment/natural-resource-committee/#tab-id-1 (last visited May 4, 2017) (website
hosting meeting minutes and draft documents for advisory group working on
coordination ordinance).
29.
See Karla Pomeroy, County Advances Natural Resources Plan,
GREYBULL STANDARD (Mar. 12, 2015), http://smalltownnews.com/article.php?
catname=Local%20Government&pub=Greybull%20Standard&pid=13&aid=315504
(explaining that Big Horn County, Wyoming, is working with American Stewards of
Liberty on a coordination ordinance).
30.
BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9. See infra Part IV (discussing
the Baker County Plan).
31.
See Peacher, supra note 5. Crook and Grant Counties, Oregon, are
working on—but have yet to enact—coordination ordinances. See, e.g., Amanda
Peacher, Crook County Leaders Unexpectedly Table Natural Resources Plan,
OREGON PUBLIC BROADCASTING (July 20, 2016), http://www.opb.org/news/
article/crook-county-leaders-table-natural-resource-plan/; George Plaven, Grant
County Sheriff Demands Coordination With Forest Service, EAST OREGONIAN (Oct.
9, 2015), http://www.eastoregonian.com/eo/local-news/20151009/grant-countysheriff-demands-coordination-with-forest-service (Grant County commissioners
refused to adopt Natural Resources Plan drafted by deputized county residents).
32.
See, e.g., BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 15–17 (requiring
federal land planners to evaluate economic effects of land planning to local
economy, and proposing federal payments to mitigate and compensate for
management decisions with detrimental effects to local economy).
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administration, these ordinances could signal profound changes in public
land management.
This Article explores the new wave of county coordination
ordinances and examines their consistency with congressional statutes,
agency regulations, and the Constitution’s Property and Supremacy
Clauses. Part II provides background on the Property Clause and the
tension between federal and local control of public lands. Part III
explains the statutory provisions in NFMA and FLPMA that counties
rely on in arguing the federal government must conform to local
government policies concerning land use decisions. Part IV explores the
origins of the coordination movement and explains the contents of a
recent coordination ordinance, the Baker County Natural Resources Plan.
Part V discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in Granite Rock and its
legacy, 33 using the Baker County plan as an illustrative coordination
ordinance to evaluate whether counties may impose their version of
coordination on the federal government. Part VI explains the role
counties might play under current law to work with the federal
government in managing public lands, and considers the uncertainties
now posed by the Trump Administration. The Article concludes that
county governments have an important—and perhaps underused—role in
working collaboratively with federal agencies to make responsible land
management decisions. But local governments seeking coordination
must understand the limits of their authority and not mislead their
constituents by enacting natural resource plans that are preempted by
federal law.
II. BACKGROUND: THE TENSION BETWEEN LOCAL AND
FEDERAL CONTROL
The federal government’s land management policies varied
widely over the past 200 years. In the nineteenth century, the federal
33.
See California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572,
581–82 (1987) (state may require environmental permit for mining on national
forests); see also S.D. Mining Ass’n v. Lawrence Cnty., 155 F.3d 1005, 1011 (8th
Cir. 1998) (county environmental protection ordinance that effectively banned the
only profitable mining technique on federal land was preempted); Bohmker v. State,
172 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1164–65 (D. Or. 2016) (state moratorium on motorized
instream-mining not preempted because law is a reasonable environmental
regulation), appeal docketed, No. 16-35262; People v. Rinehart, 377 P.3d 818, 829–
30 (Cal. 2016) (state may restrict certain mining techniques on public lands to
protect other resources); Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary Cnty., 913 P.2d 1141,
1143 (Idaho 1995) (county cannot require federal government to comply with county
land use plan).
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government purchased what is now the American West from Indian
tribes34 and foreign governments. 35 Throughout the following century,
Congress enacted public land laws that largely facilitated disposal of
these lands from the public domain to private ownership.36 During this
era, the Supreme Court ruled that westerners had an implied license to
use the public lands as a grazing commons.37 Livestock owners used this
implied license to overgraze western public lands, resulting in reduced
forage and erosion that eventually contributed materially to the Dust
Bowl in the 1920s and 1930s.38
In 1906, Gifford Pinchot’s regulations ended this grazing freefor-all in national forests.39 On the high desert, free grazing ended in
34.
See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 603–605 (1823)
(establishing that only the U.S. government may purchase land from Native
Americans); see also Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28,
33–34 (1947) (“[E]xcept for a few tracts of land in the Southwest, practically all of
the public domain of the continental United States (excluding Alaska) has been
purchased from the Indians.”).
35.
In 1803, President Jefferson doubled the size of the United States
through the Louisiana Purchase, which included most land west of the Mississippi
River and the northern Rocky Mountains. See GEORGE C. COGGINS, CHARLES F.
WILKINSON, JOHN D. LESHY & ROBERT L. FISCHMAN, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND
RESOURCES LAW 48 (7th ed. 2014). In 1845, the U.S. annexed Texas from Mexico.
See id. at 50. The following year, the U.S. and Great Britain entered the Oregon
Treaty, which added the Pacific Northwest to the federal government’s ownership.
See id. at 51. In 1848, as a result of the war with Mexico, Mexico granted the
American Southwest to the U.S. in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. See id. The
United States purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867. See id.
36.
E.g., General Preemption Act of 1841, ch. 16, 5 Stat. 453 (granting
squatters on public land the option of purchasing the property from the federal
government); Graduation Act of 1854, ch. 244, 10 Stat. 574 (setting purchase prices
of public land per acre, with price discounts for undesirable lands); Homestead Act
of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (granting 160 acres of public land to settlers who
improved land and lived there five years); Pacific Railroad Act of 1862, ch. 120, 12
Stat. 489 (granting railroads ten square miles of public land for every mile of rail
built); General Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (establishing system for
miners to acquire patents to discoveries of valuable mineral deposits); Desert Land
Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (granting settlers 640 acres of public land for a
small fee and proof of irrigation); Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916, Pub. L.
No. 290, 39 Stat. 862 (granting 640 acres of public land for grazing but reserving
mineral estate to the U.S.).
37.
Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890).
38.
See DEBRA L. DONAHUE, THE WESTERN RANGE REVISITED 33–36
(Gordon Bakken ed., 1999).
39.
In 1897, Congress granted the Secretary of Interior authority to
make rules and regulations for forest reserves. Surveying the Public Lands, ch. 2, §
300, 30 Stat. 32, 35. In 1905, Congress transferred this authority to the Department
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1934, when Congress passed the Taylor Grazing Act (“Taylor Act”).40
The Taylor Act placed virtually all unreserved federal western lands into
grazing districts41 and established a permit and fee system for grazing
public lands.42 Congress and the Department of Interior granted existing
ranchers favorable terms: low fees, permission for established ranchers to
continue existing levels of grazing, and largely local control over range
management in the form of “grazing advisory councils.”43 Nevertheless,
the statute marked a major change in public lands policy by closing open
grazing commons on non-forest federal lands, helping end the homestead
era.44
In 1976, Congress expressly declared—in the first provision of
FLPMA— that it was “the policy of the United States that the public
lands be retained in Federal ownership, unless . . . disposal of a particular
parcel will serve the national interest.” 45 Under the Taylor Act and
FLPMA, the amount of land under federal control remained fairly static
for the past eighty years, except for relatively small parcels that Congress
bought, sold, and exchanged with states and private parties.46 In 2014,
of Agriculture. Pub. L. No. 34, 33 Stat. 628 (1905). Gifford Pinchot, the first Chief
of the Forest Service, proceeded to institute grazing regulations for federally-owned
forests in 1906. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 509 (1911). The Supreme
Court upheld Pinchot’s authority to set grazing rules for national forests in 1911, id.
at 521–22; Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1911), thereby revoking
the public license to graze those areas the Court recognized in 1890. Buford, 133
U.S. at 326.
40.
Taylor Grazing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934)
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 315 (2012)); see George C. Coggins &
Margaret Lindbergh-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Management II: The
Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 48 (1982) (“The major Taylor Act
goals were improvement of range condition and stabilization of the western livestock
industry.”).
41.
43 U.S.C. § 315.
42.
Id. § 315(b) (requiring the Department of Interior to collect
“reasonable fees” and give preference in issuing permits to “those within or near a
district who are landowners engaged in the livestock business, bona fide occupants
or settlers, or owners of water or water rights”).
43.
See Coggins & Lindbergh-Johnson, supra note 40, at 60–63.
44.
See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 35, at 96 (“The [Taylor Grazing
Act] ushered in the end of the homesteading era. While President Franklin
Roosevelt closed most of the public domain to disposition by making sweeping
executive withdrawals in 1935 and 1936, homesteading remained possible, if barely
so, until it was officially ended in [FLPMA].”).
45.
43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (2012).
46.
Between the years 1781 and 2013, the federal government
transferred 816 million acres of federal land to private ownership. See VINCENT,
supra note 18, at 2 (explaining that 97% of these transfers were before 1940).
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the federal government owned 46.9% of the land in the eleven
coterminous western states, totaling 353 million acres.47
The Property Clause gives the federal government plenary
authority to act as both a proprietor and sovereign of its lands.48 For
example, in Light v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that its
Property Clause authority enables Congress to withdraw lands in federal
ownership from settlement without a state’s consent, and to regulate
those lands contrary to state law. 49 In United States v. Gettysburg
Electric Railway Co., the Court ruled that the Property Clause authorized
federal condemnation of lands for a national battlefield.50
The Property Clause power extends extra-territorially beyond the
bounds of public lands, allowing the federal government to extinguish
fires on private lands that threaten public lands51 and to protect wildlife
on federal lands contrary to state law.52 In United States v. Gratiot, the
Supreme Court rejected the argument that the term “dispose” in the
Property Clause gave the federal government only the authority to
convey its land by sale, upholding leasing of lead mines.53 Recognizing
Congress’s discretion in managing federal lands, the Court ruled that
“disposal” does not mean “selling.”54

47.
See id. at 20. The eleven contiguous western states are Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming.
48.
The federal government may act as proprietor by bringing trespass
or nuisance claims, giving permission to use public lands, or by selling use-rights on
federal land. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897). The government
may act as a sovereign by, for example, prohibiting actions on private parcels
adjoining federal lands that would frustrate the federal government’s intentions for
uses of public land. See id. at 525–26 (“The general government doubtless has a
power over its own property analogous to the police power of the several states, and
the extent to which it may go in the exercise of such power is measured by the
exigencies of the particular case. If it be found to be necessary, for the protection of
the public or of intending settlers, to forbid all inclosures of public lands, the
government may do so.”).
49.
220 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1911).
50.
160 U.S. 668, 683 (1896).
51.
United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 (1927) (“Congress may
prohibit the doing of acts upon privately owned lands that imperil the publicly
owned forests.”) (Holmes, J.).
52.
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546 (1976).
53.
39 U.S. 526, 537–38 (1840).
54.
Id. at 538–39 (“[T]he words ‘dispose of,’ cannot receive the
construction contended for at the bar; that they vest in Congress the power only to
sell, and not to lease such lands. The disposal must be left to the discretion of
Congress.”).
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The Supreme Court has invariably upheld Congress’s authority
under the Property Clause. 55 Yet, westerners have periodically
challenged federal authority to own public land. In the 1970s and 1980s,
advocates for state ownership of western public lands mounted the
Sagebrush Rebellion.56 The rebels unsuccessfully challenged the federal
government’s discretion to withhold public land from sale in Nevada ex
rel. Nevada State Board of Agriculture v. United States.57 On the basis
of the plenary congressional authority to manage public lands, the federal
district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim,58 and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected
the rebellion’s constitutional argument that states are entitled to
ownership of public lands.59
55.
See California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572,
580 (1987) (“This Court has ‘repeatedly observed’ that ‘[t]he power over the public
land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.’”); Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539
(“[W]e have repeatedly observed that ‘[t]he power over the public land thus
entrusted to Congress is without limitations.’”); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v.
McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294–95 (1958) (same); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272,
273 (1954) (“The power of Congress to dispose of any kind of property belonging to
the United States ‘is vested in Congress without limitation.’”); Fed. Power Comm’n
v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 21 (1952) (“The power of Congress over public
lands, conferred by [the Property Clause], is ‘without limitations.’”); United States v.
California, 332 U.S. 19, 27 (1947) (“We have said that the [Property Clause] is
without limitation.”); United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940) (“The
power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.”);
Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92, 99 (1871) (“With respect to the public domain, the
Constitution vests in Congress the power of disposition and of making all needful
rules and regulations. That power is subject to no limitations.”); Gratiot, 39 U.S. at
537 (“Congress has the same power over [territories] as over any other property
belonging to the United States; and this power is vested in Congress without
limitation.”); see also United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314, 1318 (9th Cir. 1997)
(reviewing the history of Property Clause cases, and concluding “under the Property
Clause, the United States can administer its federal lands any way it chooses”).
56.
See Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An
Intergovernmental Perspective of the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL. L. 847, 848
(1982) (“The management of public lands and natural resources in the West has been
the subject of growing controversy. While many issues are at stake, the battle has
coalesced around the movement known as the Sagebrush Rebellion. The rebels offer
a simple proposition: title to the vast public domain in the twelve western states
should be deeded to the states—lock, stock, and barrel.”).
57.
512 F. Supp. 166, 168 (D. Nev. 1981), aff’d, 699 F.2d 486, 487 (9th
Cir. 1983) (affirming dismissal of Nevada’s case on mootness grounds because the
Department of Interior rescinded its moratorium on land disposal).
58.
Id. at 172.
59.
Gardner, 107 F.3d at 1318–20 (holding that: (1) the Property
Clause allows the federal government to own land and establish forest reserves
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In the early 1990s, the Sagebrush Rebellion reformulated as the
County Supremacy movement, and more than thirty western counties
enacted ordinances asserting authority over federal lands.60 For example,
in 1994, county commissioners in Nye County, Nevada, adopted
resolutions declaring that Nevada owned all public lands within its state
boundary and claiming county ownership of all “travel corridors” across
public lands in Nye County. 61 After a county commissioner began
bulldozing roads on federal lands, the federal government filed suit
against the county.62 In United States v. Nye County, Nevada, a federal
district court declared the federal government had sufficient authority to
own and manage public lands within Nye County, and that federal law
preempted county resolutions claiming new county rights-of-way across
federal land.63
Self-styled “constitutionalists,” including Ammon Bundy and the
Malheur occupiers, 64 state politicians, 65 and county elected officials 66
within states; (2) the equal footing doctrine does not require the federal government
to give Nevada title to public lands; and (3) federal land holdings within Nevada’s
borders are consistent with the Nevada Statehood Act and the Tenth Amendment).
60.
See OSENBAUGH & STONER, supra note 2, at 498. Counties do not
have federal constitutional status because the United States Constitution is only
about federal versus state relations. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
61.
United States v. Nye Cnty, Nev., 920 F. Supp. 1108, 1111 (D. Nev.
1996).
62.
Id. at 1111–12.
63.
Id. at 1120; see also Robert Glicksman, Fear and Loathing on the
Federal Lands, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 647, 659 (1996) (“Nye County and Gardner
remove whatever slim doubts may have remained about the legality of federal land
ownership in the western states. These two cases confirm the obvious: claims that
the federal land management agencies are powerless to own and manage activities
on the lands under their jurisdiction are ‘legally frivolous.’ More broadly, as one
commentator aptly remarked, ‘the county supremacy ordinances have the durability
of cow chips.’”).
64.
See Tay Wiles & Nathan Thompson, Who’s Who Inside and On the
Outskirts of the Malheur Occupation, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Jan. 11, 2016),
http://www.hcn.org/articles/whos-who-at-the-oregon-standoff-malhuer-bundy (“The
occupiers, led by Ammon Bundy, have demanded that the federal government hand
over the refuge to the citizens of Harney County . . . . Many of Bundy’s fellow
occupiers at Malheur are members of militia groups who are new to the [Sagebrush
Rebellion arguments], but who share a constitutionalist, right-wing ideology.”).
65.
See Jack Healy & Kirk Johnson, The Larger, But Quieter Than
Bundy, Push to Take Over Federal Land, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 10, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/11/us/the-larger-but-quieter-than-bundy-push-totake-over-federal-land.html (“Ken Ivory, a Republican state representative from

BLUMM PROOF (Do Not Delete)

16

9/24/2017 4:28 AM

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 38

continue to challenge the federal government’s authority to own and
manage public lands. But reversing 200 years of Property Clause
jurisprudence would require an unlikely rejection of bedrock principles
in American government, including judicial review67 and the doctrine of
implied powers.68
Utah, has been roaming the West with an alluring pitch to cattle ranchers, farmers
and conservatives upset with how Washington controls the wide-open public spaces
out here: This land is your land, he says, and not the federal government’s.”); Joshua
Zaffos, New Leader Steps Up for the American Lands Council, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS (Feb 10, 2016), http://www.hcn.org/articles/new-leader-steps-up-for-theamerican-lands-council (noting that Montana state senator Jennifer Fielder would
take Ken Ivory’s place as CEO of the American Lands Council, and explaining
“Fielder is vice chair of the Montana Republican Party and has served as a board
member of the Sanders Natural Resources Council, a county natural resources
advisory committee that has backed county ‘coordination’ and local authority over
federal lands. John Trochmann, founder of the anti-government Militia of Montana,
which has ties to white-supremacist groups, started the council in 2006, according to
a 2012 Montana Human Rights Network report. Fielder also has connections with
the Oath Keepers, a constitutionalist militia group.”).
66.
See Les Zaitz, Grant County Sheriff, Deputy Botched Arrest in
‘Egregious Abuse of Power,’ THE OREGONIAN (June 12, 2016),
http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2016/06/egregious_
abuse_seen_in_grant.html (“[Grant County, Oregon, Sheriff Glenn Palmer] gained
national notice earlier this year for his sympathy for militants who took over the
Malheur National Wildlife Refuge. He considers himself a ‘constitutional sheriff’
and vows to protect citizens from abusive government.”).
67.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret
that rule.”). On the other hand, self-proclaimed constitutional educator and talk
show personality KrisAnne Hall—quite popular among the Bundy crowd—claims
judicial review is unconstitutional:
The Bureau of Land Management, the federal government,
controlling our land, is a law that is lawless. It is outside the
Constitution. Do not tell me ‘the Supreme Court said this or that’
because the Supreme Court does not have the constitutional
authority to expand the power of the federal government or create
new powers. That is not the role of the Supreme Court. They
don’t even have the authority to be the ultimate arbiters of the
Constitution. James Madison—the father of the Constitution—
tells us in 1798 as he’s arguing before the ratification of the
Constitution, ‘Hey, the Supreme Court of the United States is not
above the states. The Supreme Court of the United States cannot
make law. The Supreme Court of the United States is not the
ultimate arbiter of the Constitution.’ James Madison so very
clearly explains that the ultimate arbiters of the Constitution are
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III. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY CONTEXT: NFMA AND
FLPMA
The federal agencies managing much of the western public
lands—the United States Forest Service (“Forest Service”) and Bureau of
Land Management (“BLM”)—operate under different statutory
mandates, which include “coordination” requirements. 69 The Forest
Service generally manages mountainous forestlands, while BLM
administers largely arid rangelands.70 Both agencies manage federal land
within counties that have enacted coordination ordinances.71 This Part
considers the Forest Service and BLM statutes and regulations that
counties rely on to invoke coordination rights.72
the states themselves. They are the creators of the contract, they
are the drafters of the contract, they are the ones who actually
ratified the contract creating the federal government. The states
are the creators of the federal government, they are the controllers
of the federal government. It is time for us to understand the
proper role and function of our government. Do not tell me
‘Marbury v. Madison.’ That is circular logic. The Supreme
Court cannot create an opinion that expands its own power.
KrisAnne Hall, What’s Really Going On in Oregon! Taking Back the Narrative!
3:52–5:23 (KrisAnne Hall YouTube Channel, Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=T424sWq1SkE.
68.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 423 (1819) (“[W]here the
law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to
the government, to undertake here to inquire into the decree of its necessity, would
be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on
legislative ground. This court disclaims all pretensions to such a power.”).
69.
Most of the country’s public lands are managed by five federal
agencies: the U.S. Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, and the Department of
Defense. VINCENT, supra note 18, at 1, 6. The Forest Service and BLM manage a
large majority of western public lands. Id. at 6 (map).
70.
Id. at 8; COGGINS ET AL., supra note 35, at 25–26.
71.
See, e.g., BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 4 (the Forest
Service manages 33% of the land in Baker County, and BLM manages 18.5%).
72.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s (FWS) management of the
National Wildlife Refuge System is governed by the National Wildlife Refuge
Administration Act, as amended by the National Wildlife Refuge System
Improvement Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-57, 111 Stat. 1252 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 668dd-ee (2012)). Unlike the Forest Service and BLM governing statutes
(described below), the FWS statutory mandate does not require the FWS to
coordinate with local governments. Instead, the Refuge System Improvement Act
requires the FWS only to “coordinate” with states in developing refuge conservation
plans. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(e)(3)(B). In managing the refuge system, the agency must
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The Forest Service’s chief governing statute, NFMA,73 requires
all management actions on national forest lands to be consistent with the
applicable Forest Service land and resource management plan.74 NFMA
also requires the agency to “develop, maintain, and, as appropriate,
revise land and resource management plans for units of the National
Forest System, coordinated with the land and resource management
planning processes of State and local governments and other Federal
agencies.”75 Although NFMA does not define the term “coordinated,”
the Forest Service’s regulations interpret the coordination language to
require that in developing or revising plans, the agency must “review the
planning and land use policies” of local governments and disclose the
results of that review in the agency’s analysis under the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).76 The regulations make clear the
section should not be read “to indicate that the responsible official will
. . . conform management to meet non–Forest Service objectives or
policies.” 77 Neither NFMA nor agency regulations require the Forest
Service to conduct land planning via government-to-government
consultation with counties.
FLPMA is BLM’s statutory mandate for public land
management. 78 Like NFMA, FLPMA requires BLM to develop and
“ensure effective coordination, interaction, and cooperation with owners of land
adjoining refuges and the fish and wildlife agency of the States in which the units of
the System are located[.]” Id. § 668dd(a)(4)(E). The county coordination
ordinances do not address these provisions governing FWS land management.
73.
National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90
Stat. 2949. See also Forest Service Organic Administration Act of 1897, ch. 2 ch.
300, 30 Stat. 34, 36 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-478, 479-482, 551 (2012)).
74.
16 U.S.C. § 1604(i) (2012). See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Martin, 168
F.3d 1, 4–5 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding a Forest Service decision to issue a timber sale
was arbitrary and capricious where forest plan committed the agency to collect
population data on certain species before issuing timber sales, and the agency failed
to do so).
75.
16 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (emphasis added).
76.
36 C.F.R. § 219.4(b)(2) (2017). The review must consider local
government objectives, the “compatibility” of planning documents, and
“opportunities for the plan to address the impacts defined or to contribute to joint
objectives,” as well as “opportunities to resolve or reduce conflicts.” Id. §
219.4(b)(2)(i)–(iv). The Forest Service’s 1982 planning regulations included the
same requirement that the agency “review the planning and land use policies” of
local governments and disclose those results in the agency’s NEPA analysis. See id.
§ 219.7(c).
77.
Id. § 219.4(b)(3).
78.
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94576, 90 Stat. 2728.
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maintain land use plans.79 FLPMA directs the Secretary of Interior “to
the extent consistent with the laws governing the administration of the
public lands, coordinate the land use inventory, planning, and
management activities . . . with the land use planning and management
programs . . . of the States and local governments within which the lands
are located.” 80 FLPMA grants BLM considerable discretion in
coordinating with local governments, requiring the Secretary’s land use
plans only to “be consistent with State and local plans to the maximum
extent he finds consistent with Federal law and the purposes of this
Act.”81 BLM regulations in effect through December 2016 interpreted
the objectives of coordination to include considering and “keep[ing]

79.
80.

43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2012).
Id. § 1712(c)(9) (emphasis added). The statute continues:

In implementing this directive, the Secretary shall, to the extent
he finds practical, keep apprised of State, local, and tribal land
use plans; assure that consideration is given to those State, local,
and tribal plans that are germane in the development of land use
plans for public lands; assist in resolving, to the extent practical,
inconsistencies between Federal and non-Federal Government
plans, and shall provide for meaningful public involvement of
State and local government officials, both elected and appointed,
in the development of land use programs, land use regulations,
and land use decisions for public lands, including early public
notice of proposed decisions which may have a significant impact
on non-Federal lands. Such officials in each State are authorized
to furnish advice to the Secretary with respect to the development
and revision of land use plans, land use guidelines, land use rules,
and land use regulations for the public lands within such State and
with respect to such other land use matters as may be referred to
them by him.
Id. (emphasis added).
81.
Id. Professor Coggins expounded on FLPMA’s coordination
provision in a 1983 law review article, calling it “as curious as it is lengthy.” See
George C. Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management IV: FLPMA, PRIA,
and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL. L. 1, 96 (1983) (“[43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9)]
is as curious as it is lengthy. Congress basically required the Secretary to coordinate
planning with every other governmental entity in the area and to try to make the
federal land use plan compatible with state or local plans. The section also makes
clear that the federal plan is dominant; the Secretary need not fully comply with
local requirements. Unlike the other subsections of section 1712(c), this provision is
peppered with ‘to-the-extent-thats.’ The Secretary can disregard local advice if
impractical or inconsistent with federal law or purposes. Section 1712(f) requires
even broader public participation, ‘including public hearings where appropriate.’”).
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apprised” of local plans, 82 “resolving, to the extent practicable,
inconsistencies between Federal and non-Federal government plans,”83
and providing “meaningful public involvement” to local government
officials. 84 In December 2016, BLM promulgated its “Planning 2.0”
process, revising portions of the FLPMA regulations, but those
regulations were rescinded in March 2017 under the terms of the
Congressional Review Act. 85 Like FLPMA, both versions of the
82.
43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–1(a)(1), (2) (2016). BLM revised these
regulations in 2016, see below note 85, but the new rule maintained this language.
43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–2(a)(1), (2) (2017).
83.
43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–1(a)(3) (2016). BLM revised these regulations
in 2016, see below note 85, but the new rule maintained similar language. 43 C.F.R.
§ 1610.3–2(a)(3) (2017) (replacing “practicable” in the regulation with “practical”).
84.
Id. § 1610.3–2(a)(4). BLM revised these regulations in 2016, see
infra note 85, but the new rule maintained this language. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–2(a)(4)
(2017).
85.
On March 27, 2017, President Trump signed a resolution rescinding
the Planning 2.0 regulations. See Pub. Law. No. 115-12, H.J. Res. 44 (March 27,
2017) (nullifying the Planning 2.0 FLPMA regulations). Nevertheless, we provide a
discussion of the Planning 2.0 changes here because we believe the 2017 regulations
required substantially similar coordination and consistency obligations as the
previous rules, and did not provide any new deference or planning authority to local
governments.
The “Planning 2.0” regulations altered the language of 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–
1 and 1610.3–2, and added a provision at 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–3. 81 Fed. Reg.
89,580, 89,614–22 (Dec. 12, 2016). Under the previous rule, § 1610.3–1 addressed
coordination of planning efforts, and § 1610.3–2 addressed consistency requirements
between federal and non-federal plans. The “Planning 2.0” regulations inserted a
new provision at § 1610.3–1 titled “Consultation with Indian Tribes,” and the
“Coordination of Planning Efforts” and “Consistency Requirements” provisions
were redesignated, respectively, as § 1610.3–2, and § 1610.3–3. 81 Fed. Reg. at
89,614–22.
The Planning 2.0 regulations concerning coordination and consistency
between federal and local plans would not have differed significantly from the
previous, 2016 version. See id. at 89,614–22 (explaining the differences between
2016 FLPMA regulations at 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3 and the new Planning 2.0
regulations). The Planning 2.0 “Coordination of Planning Efforts” regulation
included a new sentence stating that BLM is to coordinate with state and local
governments “to the extent consistent with federal laws and regulations applicable to
public lands.” Compare 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–1(a) (2016) (“In addition to the public
involvement prescribed by § 1610.2, the following coordination is to be
accomplished with other Federal agencies, state and local governments, and
federally recognized Indian tribes.”), with 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–2(a) (2017) (“In
addition to the public involvement prescribed by § 1610.2, and to the extent
consistent with Federal laws and regulations applicable to public lands,
coordination is to be accomplished with other Federal agencies, State and local
governments, and Indian tribes.”) (emphasis added). BLM explained this revision in
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regulations acknowledge the agency’s broad discretion in reaching
consistency with local plans.86 FLPMA and its regulations require BLM
the Federal Register as a clarification of the meaning of coordination in FLPMA, not
a change in policy. See 81 Fed. Reg. at 89,615 (“Final § 1610.3–2(a) does not
represent a change from current practice or policy.”); 81 Fed. Reg. 9,674, 9,702
(Feb. 25, 2016) (“[The new language in 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–2(a)] would be no
change from current practice or policy. The BLM only wishes to clarify that BLM
must comply with Federal laws and regulations.”).
The Planning 2.0 regulations clearly outlined “coordination requirements,”
requiring only that BLM provide local governments “opportunity for review, advice,
and suggestions on issues and topics which may affect or influence other agency or
other government programs.” 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–2(c) (2017). Under this
regulation, local governments were entitled to notice of proposed changes to BLM
plans where the local government has requested such notice or where the BLM has
reason to believe the local government would be interested in opportunities for
public involvement. Id. § 1610.3–2(c)(3); see also id. § 1610.3–2(c)(5) (requiring
BLM to provide 30 days notice to local governments of opportunities for review and
comment on land planning).
86.
FLPMA regulations require consistency with local plans only “so
long as the . . . resource management plans are also consistent with the purposes,
policies and programs of Federal laws and regulations applicable to public lands.”
43 C.F.R. 1610.3–2(a) (2016).
The Planning 2.0 version of the “Consistency Requirements” regulation
was quite similar to the 2016 version of the regulation. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–3(a)
(2017) (“Resource management plans shall be consistent with officially approved
and adopted plans of other Federal agencies, State and local governments, and Indian
tribes to the maximum extent the BLM finds consistent with the purposes of FLPMA
and other Federal laws and regulations applicable to public lands, and the purposes,
policies and programs implementing such laws and regulations.”) (emphasis added);
see also 81 Fed. Reg. at 89,618–22 (explaining the differences between the 2016
consistency regulations and the new Planning 2.0 version).
BLM received comments during the Planning 2.0 process objecting to the
requirement in 43 C.F.R. 1610.3–2(a) (2016) that BLM plans be consistent with
local plans only so long as those plans were consistent with the purposes and
requirements of federal law and regulation, see 81 Fed. Reg. at 89,618, but the new
Planning 2.0 consistency regulations maintained this requirement in slightly different
language. See 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–3(a) (2017) (quoted above). BLM explained its
decision not to require more consistency between BLM and local plans:
The BLM received public comments in opposition to [43 C.F.R. §
1610.3–2(a) (2016)], noting that under FLPMA the obligation for
consistency with local plans does not hinge on whether or not
they are consistent with Federal purposes, policies and programs,
only whether they do not contradict Federal Laws. The BLM
disagrees with these comments. The BLM does not interpret
FLPMA to require resource management plans to be consistent
with the described non-BLM plans if those plans are simply
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to listen to local sentiments on public land management but do not
require the agency to ensure compatibility with local government
resource plans.87
No federal court has interpreted the “coordination” provisions in
either NFMA or FLPMA. Under the deferential judicial review of the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (“APA”), 88 federal courts will
likely uphold reasonable agency regulatory interpretations of
“coordination.”89 Counties lack authority to interpret the coordination
lawful under Federal law and FLPMA. Rather, and particularly
given 1712(c)(9)'s explicit reference to the purposes of FLPMA,
and BLM's and the Secretary's ultimate responsibility as the
manager of the public lands, BLM interprets FLPMA to authorize
it to evaluate whether those non-BLM plans are consistent with
the policies underlying BLM management of the public lands.
81 Fed. Reg. at 89,618–19.
87.
BLM’s “Desk Guide to Coordination” addresses situations where
local plans are inconsistent with federal law and policy, explaining:
In such cases, the BLM does not have an obligation to seek
consistency. For example, in preparing [resource management
plans] the BLM is required to designate and protect areas of
critical environmental concern (ACECs). The BLM could not
honor a request from a county government that only ACECs
consistent with the county’s general plan be designated in the
[resource management plan], if this would prevent the BLM from
complying with its statutory obligation.
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, A DESK GUIDE TO COOPERATING AGENCY
RELATIONSHIPS AND COORDINATION WITH INTERGOVERNMENTAL PARTNERS 33
(2012).
88.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
89.
See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842–43 (1984).
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If,
however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary
in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
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provisions in NFMA or FLPMA to create binding obligations on federal
agencies.90 NFMA and FLPMA require the Forest Service and BLM to
consider the views of and attempt to collaborate with local governments
in agency planning. But neither the statutes nor agency regulations
require the Forest Service or BLM to conduct government-togovernment consultation with county governments on public land
management.
IV. THE COORDINATION ORDINANCES
Some western counties have approved coordination ordinances,91
while other counties are in various stages of preparing their own plans.92
the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id.
90.
As one attorney advised after reviewing a coordination bill in
Montana, when “a reviewing court reviews [an agency] management decision, it will
look to see whether the [agency] complied with its own authorizing statutes and
regulations, not whether it complied with a unilaterally enacted county
interpretation.” Memorandum from Kenneth P. Pitt, Attorney, to Travis McAdam,
Dir., Montana Human Rights Network (June 26, 2012), available at
http://www.mhrn.org/publications/fact%20sheets%20and%20adivsories/Final%20Le
gal%20Memo%20on%20Coordination.pdf.
91.
See, e.g., BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 10 (“Baker County
expects . . . federal agencies to engage in coordination with the County, upon the
County’s request, for land use planning efforts and on an ongoing basis—as
mandated by applicable statute, regulations, policy, and case law.”); KANE CNTY.,
UTAH, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN 7 (Mar. 23, 2015) [hereinafter KANE COUNTY
PLAN] (“Federal land management planning processes shall include Kane County as
an active, coordinating, on-going partner, consistent with federal mandates involving
coordination. Federal land management plans shall be consistent with county goals
and policies[.]”); RAVALLI CNTY., MONT., RESOLUTION NO. 2978 1 (Nov. 21, 2012)
[hereinafter RAVALLI COUNTY RESOLUTION] (“It is the policy of Ravalli County to
invoke coordination with any and all appropriate agencies at the beginning of the
scoping process and throughout the process for all areas of natural resource
management and use.”); MONTEZUMA CNTY., COLO., RESOLUTION #08-2010 2 (Aug.
30, 2010) (Board of County Commissioners “calls upon all federal agencies and
state agencies linked with them in implementing plans, projects, policies, and
management actions in Montezuma County to coordinate with the Board of County
Commissioners or their designee as they are required to do by federal laws[.]”);
HARNEY CNTY., OR., COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 29 (Nov. 2009) (“Harney County will
keep an open line of communication with all government entities and Non
Government Organizations (NGO’s) to exchange ideas, views and plans with the
intent that these bodies will attempt to coordinate with and abide by the Harney
County Comprehensive Plan.”); MALHEUR CNTY., OR., MALHEUR COUNTY PLAN, 2-
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This Part explains the origins of the coordination movement, then
discusses the contents of the Baker County, Oregon Natural Resources
Plan.
A. Origins of the Coordination Movement
For several years, the Public Lands Council 93 and American
Stewards94 have provided materials urging counties to enact coordination
ordinances.95 Due to their influence, many of the county coordination
ordinances are quite similar. For example, the Baker County ordinance
duplicates the language (and the font) describing coordination in the
Public Lands Council’s 2012 “Beginner’s Guide to Coordination.”96 The
4-3 (Dec. 5, 2001) [hereinafter MALHEUR COUNTY PLAN] (requiring federal agencies
to “[c]oordinate procedures to the fullest extent possible with the county, on an equal
basis and not with the county as subordinate, prior to and during the taking of any
federal . . . action”); WAYNE CNTY., UTAH, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN 1
(“Wayne County asserts planning authority over all lands and natural resources
within its geographical boundaries even though the United States owns the vast
majority of those lands and resources. Like any other landowner in the County, the
United States is subject to Wayne County’s land and natural resource plans and
policies to the maximum extent, provided such plans and policies of Wayne County
are consistent with federal law.”).
92.
See BIG HORN CNTY., WYO., [DRAFT] NATURAL RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR STATE AND FEDERAL LANDS A-4 (Sept. 10, 2016)
[hereinafter BIG HORN COUNTY PLAN] (“Coordination recognizes that the
responsibilities of local governments are ‘equal, not subordinate’ to the duties of
federal and state governments, and that the needs of the local governments must be
incorporated into the federal and state planning processes. . . . The County
recognizes that federal law supersedes state and local law, and that it is federal law
that requires agencies to coordinate and reach consistency with Big Horn County
plans and policies.”); George Plaven, Grant County Sheriff Demands Coordination
with Forest Service, EAST OREGONIAN (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.eastoregonian.
com/eo/local-news/20151009/grant-county-sheriff-demands-coordination-withforest-service (Grant County, Oregon, commissioners refused to adopt Natural
Resources Plan drafted by deputized county residents); Amanda Peacher, Crook
County Rejects Controversial Natural Resources Plan, THE OREGONIAN (Aug. 30,
2016), http://www.opb.org/news/article/crook-county-rejects-natural-resource-plan/
(Crook County, Oregon, government voted against adopting current draft of
coordination ordinance after county attorney “said the submitted plan didn’t pass
legal muster.”); Pend Oreille County, Wash., Natural Resources Committee, supra
note 28 (website hosting meeting minutes and draft documents for advisory group
working on coordination ordinance).
93.
See RIEBER, supra note 22.
94.
See supra notes 18–21.
95.
See supra notes 17–22.
96.
Compare RIEBER, supra note 22, at 5 (“Coordination is a federally
mandated process that requires the BLM and Forest Service to work with local
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Grant County, Oregon, draft ordinance copied the text (and the font) of
the Baker County ordinance. 97 But the most conspicuous similarity
between all coordination ordinances is their shared, flawed
understanding of what “coordination” means under federal law.
American Stewards is a major source of this misunderstanding.
In its materials urging county governments to seek coordination,
American Stewards relies on a plain meaning approach to define
“coordination” in NFMA and FLPMA.98 Relying on dictionaries99 and
governments to seek consistency between federal land use planning and local land
use plans and policies. Coordination requires federal agencies do more than just
inform local governments of their future management plans and decisions, and it
requires that they do more than merely solicit comment from local government
entities. Coordination calls for something beyond that: a negotiation on a
government-to- government basis that seeks to ensure officially approved local plans
and policies are accommodated by planning and management decisions on federal
lands.”), with BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 10 (“Coordination is a
federally mandated process that requires all state and federal agencies including the
BLM and Forest Service to work with local governments to seek consistency
between state and federal land use planning and management and local land use
plans and policies. Coordination, by its plain meaning, requires state and federal
agencies do more than just inform local governments of their future management
plans and decisions and it requires that they do more than merely solicit comments
from local government entities. Coordination calls for something beyond that: a
negotiation on a government-to-government basis that seeks to ensure officially
approved local plans and policies are included in the public lands planning and
management decisions of state and federal agencies.”).
97.
See GRANT CNTY., OR., PUBLIC LANDS NATURAL RESOURCES PLAN
10 (Sept. 30, 2015), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/
2852061-Natural-Resources-Plan.html [hereinafter GRANT COUNTY PLAN] (proposed
coordination ordinance quoting the BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, verbatim).
98.
See American Stewards of Liberty, Coordination: A Strategy for
Local Control at *6–7, AMERICANSTEWARDS.US, https://www.americanstewards.us/
programs/coordination/coordination-overview/. (last visited May 4, 2017)
[hereinafter Coordination: A Strategy for Local Control] (construing “coordination”
in federal law by arguing “when a legislative body uses a word of common,
everyday usage without specific definition it is presumed that the legislative intent
was to use the word as it is commonly defined[,]” reviewing various dictionary and
state court definitions of “coordinate,” and concluding “[i]t is patently obvious that
when a legislature uses the word ‘coordinate’ or ‘coordination’ it means more than
‘cooperate’ or ‘consult’”); see also American Stewards of Liberty, Coordination
Overview, AMERICANSTEWARDS.US, https://www.americanstewards.us/programs/
coordination/coordination-overview/ (last visited May 4, 2017) [hereinafter
Coordination Overview] (“Given the dictionary definition of the term and concept of
‘coordination’ and, given the actions which the agencies must take under FLPMA, it
is apparent that Congress intended to require equal base negotiations to reach
consistency.”).
99.
See Coordination Overview, supra note 98 (“The common
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irrelevant court opinions 100 —eschewing the usual means of statutory
interpretation101—the group proclaims coordination means “government-

dictionary definition of ‘coordinate’ shows that a person or party operating in
‘coordinate’ fashion is operating as a party ‘of equal importance, rank or degree, not
subordinate.’ (Webster’s New International Dictionary)[.] The American Heritage
Dictionary defines ‘coordinate’ as ‘one that is equal in importance, rank, or
degree.’”); Coordination: A Strategy for Local Control, supra note 98, at *6 (same);
see also REIBER, supra note 22, at 12 (“The fact that the Forest Service is directed to
‘coordinate’ with local governments implies by its plain meaning that the Forest
Service must engage in a process that involves more than simply ‘considering’ the
plans and policies of local governments.”).
100. American Stewards’ materials cited two state court opinions—both
unrelated to federal land use planning—for the proposition that the plain meaning of
“coordinate” in NFMA and FLPMA is “government-to-government” consultation.
First, the American Stewards website cites California Native Plant Soc’y v. City of
Rancho Cordova, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009), for its construction of
the term “coordinate” in a city plan by relying on the Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary and New Oxford Dictionary. See Coordination Overview, supra note 98.
Ironically, the court ruled in California Native Plant Society that a city cannot
unilaterally approve a development project over the objections of the U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service where the city’s general plan commits to “coordinating” mitigation
for threatened and endangered species with the federal agency. See California
Native Plant Soc’y, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 641–43. Public Lands Council cites the same
portions of California Native Plant Society in its Beginners Guide to Coordination.
See RIEBER, supra note 22, at 12–13.
Second, American Stewards’ website and materials cite Empire Ins. Co. of
Tex. v. Cooper, 138 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Civ. App 1940), for that court’s reliance on a
dictionary definition of “coordinate.” Coordination Overview, supra note 98;
Coordination: A Strategy for Local Control, supra note 98. In Empire Insurance,
the Texas state court decided the issue whether semicolons in a life insurance policy
separated equal or subordinate clauses. 138 S.W.2d at 163–64. The case was
entirely unrelated to federal land planning, but the court recited a definition of
“semicolon” from Webster’s Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary that included
the word “coordinate.” Id. at 163. The Texas court’s opinion included a definition
for “co-ordinate,” id. at 163, which—according to American Stewards—
demonstrates that “coordination” in NFMA and FLPMA is subject to its plain
meaning, dictionary definition. See Coordination Overview, supra note 98.
American Stewards selectively cited the statutes and regulations in its
discussion of what coordination means under federal law. See id. (citing and
rephrasing FLPMA, then concluding “[g]iven the dictionary definition of the term
and concept of “coordination” and, given the actions which the agencies must take
under FLPMA, it is apparent that Congress intended to require equal base
negotiations to reach consistency”). However, the group’s materials neglect to
mention language in FLPMA and the NFMA regulations granting deference to the
agency. See supra notes 77 (agency discretion in land planning under FLPMA), 81
(agency discretion in land planning under NFMA).
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to-government” 102 consultation. American Stewards urges county
governments to invoke this aggressive interpretation of local authority by
enacting coordination ordinances.103
County commissioners may be unaware the coordination
American Stewards describes is inconsistent with federal law. American
Stewards sells annual subscriptions to counties for its advice and
materials on the coordination process, and county governments across
the West pay $1,500 fees to the group for these resources. 104 Some
101. See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842–43 (1984) (where statutory language is ambiguous, courts will defer to
reasonable agency regulations interpreting the statute).
102. See Coordination Overview, supra note 98 (“The statutes create a
process through which local government has an equal position at the negotiating
table with federal and state government agencies. They create a process which
mandates agencies to work with local government on a government-to-government
basis.”).
103. See Coordination: A Strategy for Local Control, supra note 98, at
*5 (“When Congress . . . orders agencies to coordinate their activities with local
government, they [sic] require the agencies to go to the negotiating table on an equal
footing with local government. The word ‘coordinate’ is a word of common usage, a
word of daily usage in general public communication. It is not a term of art or a term
of scientific and special meaning.”).
104. See Joshua Zaffos, Counties Use a ‘Coordination’ Clause to Fight
the Feds, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (May 11, 2015), http://www.hcn.org/issues/47.8/
counties-use-a-coordination-clause-to-fight-the-feds (“Counties typically pay
American Stewards $1,500 for an initial daylong training, plus travel expenses.”);
see, e.g., Fee Agreement between Dan Byfield, American Stewards of Liberty, and
J.R. Iman, Ravalli Cnty. (Mont.) Comm’r (May 25, 2011) [hereinafter Fee
Agreement] (agreeing to pay $1,500 for American Steward’s services in drafting and
editing coordination ordinance, drafting or editing policy statements or letters, and
preparing county commissioners for coordination with federal government, with
optional legal services from American Stewards for $150/hour). When the Ravalli
Republic newspaper published a story about the county commissioner’s contract
with American Stewards, commenters to the online story expressed concern that
American Stewards is “an extreme right wing anti-government organization” and
pointed to the group’s “overtly religious” views. See Whitney Bermes, County
Commission Signs Contract with Coordination Consultants, RAVALLI REPUBLIC
(Apr.
4,
2011),
http://ravalli
republic.com/news/local/govt-andpolitics/article_5d4005ac-5f33-11e0-8ffe-001cc4 c03286.html; see also American
Stewards
of
Liberty,
About
Our
Name,
AMERICANSTEWARDS.US
https://www.americanstewards.us/about/our-name/ (last visited May 4, 2017)
(explaining the group’s name: “Through the divine hand of our Creator, our
founding fathers established a government and guarantee of personal rights that give
American citizens the ability to control our government . . . Stewardship is a distinct
concept with its roots in biblical principles where man was given dominion over land
and animals”). Voters in Garfield County, Colorado were similarly concerned about
the county working with American Stewards. See John Stroud, Garfield County
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counties have spent more than $20,000 for the group’s materials.105 For
example, Big Horn County, Wyoming, used the group’s services 106 to
help formulate a draft of the county’s coordination ordinance, which
acknowledged that it “is the latest draft of the [Plan] following a review
and recommended modifications provided by the American Stewards of
Liberty, a consulting firm hired by Big Horn County to assist with the
development of draft policy statements.”107 In 2011, American Stewards
sent a memorandum to county commissioners in Ravalli County,
Montana, encouraging enactment of a coordination ordinance to address
Contract with Property Rights Group Gets Criticism, GLENWOOD SPRINGS POST
INDEPENDENT (July 17, 2012), http://www.post independent.com/news/garfieldcounty-contract-with-property-rights-group-gets-criticism/ (noting local concerns
about county contract with American Stewards because of the group’s “ties to the oil
and gas industry” and “alleged ties to the corporate-backed conservative lobbying
group American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC)”).
105. See Zaffos, supra note 104 (“Custer County, Idaho, had paid
American Stewards more than $23,000 as of August 2014, an HCN open-records
request revealed, and Garfield County, Colorado, has paid the group more than
$26,000 since 2012.”). In September 2016, commissioners in Garfield County,
Colorado, approved up to $40,000 for American Stewards’ services in opposing the
BLM’s Planning 2.0 process. See Garfield County, Garfield County Board of
Commissioners Meeting, GARFIELD-COUNTY.GRANICUS.COM (Sept. 6, 2016)
http://garfield-county.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=3&clip_id=1137
(video of county approving sole source contract with American Stewards of Liberty,
at 2:45:00). See supra note 85 (describing the BLM’s Planning 2.0 process).
106. See Pomeroy, supra note 29 (“One of the organizations [Big Horn
County] has used in developing the Natural Resource Plan is American Stewards of
Liberty (ASL).”).
107. BIG HORN COUNTY PLAN, supra note 92, at *1. In fact, American
Stewards is a 501(c)(3) non-profit, American Stewards of Liberty, About,
AMERICANSTEWARDS.US, https://www.americanstewards.us/about/ (last visited May
4, 2017), which we point out to correct the Big Horn County’s statement that the
group is a “consulting firm.” We do not address whether American Stewards might
be unlawfully acting as an action organization by influencing legislation. See I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (2016) (requiring that organizations with tax-exempt status not attempt
to influence legislation as a substantial part of the group’s activities); see also
Internal Revenue Service, Lobbying, IRS.GOV, https://www.irs.gov/charities-nonprofits/lobbying (last visited May 4, 2017) (“An organization will be regarded as
attempting to influence legislation if it contacts, or urges the public to contact,
members or employees of a legislative body for the purpose of proposing,
supporting, or opposing legislation, or if the organization advocates the adoption or
rejection of legislation.”). American Stewards noted in its Fee Agreement with
Ravalli County, Mont., that “[w]e do not advocate any particular policy nor will we
assist or get involved in any local political issues or situations. We provide the
education and the tools by which you can either utilize them for your benefit or not.”
Fee Agreement, supra note 104, at 1.
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wolf management issues. 108 The memorandum was drafted by thenpresident of American Stewards, attorney Fred Kelly Grant, 109 whom
Baker County commissioners placed on retainer several months before
enacting the Baker County coordination ordinance.110

108. Memorandum from Dan and Margaret Byfield, American Stewards
of Liberty, to Ravalli Cnty. Comm’rs (Feb. 9, 2011) (reviewing county
commissioner’s question “whether or not there was a way to resolve the negative
impact the endangered listing and management of the wolves” was having in Ravalli
County, and responding “of all counties impacted [by wolf recovery] across the
west, Ravalli may be in the best position to assert, through coordination, a
management plan that would be accepted.”).
109. Id. Fred Kelly Grant assisted the Hage/Byfield family in their longrunning grazing rights case, see supra note 19, against the federal government.
Jason Dearen ‘Sagebrush Rebellion’ Case Suffers Defeat, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Sept.
1,
2012),
http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/sagebrush-rebellion-casesuffers-defeat/. Grant is a former president of American Stewards of Liberty, and he
claims responsibility for ALEC’s decision to provide model coordination legislation
on their website.
See Stand & Fight Club, About Fred Kelly Grant,
STANDANDFIGHTCLUB.COM,
http://www.standandfightclub.com/about-fred-kellygrant/ (last visited May 4, 2017). He is an outspoken conspiracy theorist on
“Agenda 21,” arguing that a non-binding United Nations resolution to conserve
natural resources is actually an international plot against rural America. See Ryan
Sabalow, Controversial Lawyer Defends Property Rights, REDDING RECORD
SEARCHLIGHT (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.redding.com/news/fred-kelly-grant-talksagenda-21-coordination-with-local-activists-ep-375305599-354531551.html;
see
also Leslie Kaufman & Kate Zernike, Activists Fight Green Projects, Seeing U.N.
Plot, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/
04/us/activists-fight-green-projects-seeing-un-plot.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(“Across the country, activists with ties to the Tea Party are railing against all sorts
of local and state efforts to control sprawl and conserve energy. [Agenda 21
activists] brand government action for things like expanding public transportation
routes and preserving open space as part of a United Nations-led conspiracy to deny
property rights and herd citizens toward cities.”); Zaffos, supra note 104 (current
executive director of American Stewards of Liberty, Margaret Byfield, says she
“learned the [coordination] strategy from Fred Kelly Grant, the Hages’ litigation
chairman, who was president of American Stewards in 2006. Grant has promoted
coordination in speeches to local governments while railing against the United
Nations’ Agenda 21, a sustainable-development initiative some conservatives view
as an international conspiracy against private property rights.”).
110. Brian Addison, Baker County Working With Fred Kelly Grant to
Protect Local Lands, BAKER COUNTY PRESS (July 10, 2015), http://oregonnews.
uoregon.edu/lccn/2015260133/2015-07-10/ed-1/seq-3/; see also Aaron West,
Political Group Turns to Obscure Clause to Protect Land, BEND BULLETIN (Mar. 6,
2016), http://www.bendbulletin.com/localstate/4071793-151/political-group-turnsto-obscure-clause-to-protect (“According to Baker County Board of Commissioner
meeting documents, Grant came and spoke in 2010 and also assisted the county in
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American Stewards misled county commissioners by suggesting
commissioners have authority to require government-to-government
consultation under the coordination provisions of federal law. 111 By
heralding coordination as a potent—yet unrealized—brake on federal
land management, American Stewards has lured western counties into
expending public funds for its services. County governments, in turn, are
responding by enacting ordinances grounded on a misinterpretation of
federal law.
B. Case Study: The Baker County Natural Resources Plan
The 2015 Baker County, Oregon, Natural Resources Plan is a
prime example of a coordination ordinance. The well-publicized plan112
was adopted by the county board of commissioners in September 2015
and amended in July 2016.113 This Part explains the county’s position on
a variety of issues, including land planning, roads, grazing, logging,
mining, and special management area designations.
The county plan described the county’s “custom and culture,”
including a brief history of the Oregon Trail, the region’s reliance on the
mining and timber industries, and current county demographics. 114
During the County Supremacy movement,115 the National Federal Lands
Council assured westerners NEPA 116 required federal agencies to

2015 with creating its local natural resource plan, which now serves as a model for
the Crook County [Oregon] Natural Resources PAC’s plan.”).
111. In addition to the American Stewards’ flawed legal analysis of what
“coordination” means in federal statutes, see supra notes 98–103, the group’s
website seems to declare coordination as the supreme law of the land. American
Stewards of Liberty, Coordination, the 4 “C’s”, and Supremacy,
AMERICANSTEWARDS.US, https://www.americanstewards.us/programs/coordination/
coordination-the-4-cs-and-supremacy/ (last visited May 4, 2017) (“Congress does
have exclusive power over the federal lands. In the exercise of that exclusive power,
Congress has mandated that the Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service
‘coordinate’ their planning and management processes with local government. The
coordination mandate is found in the Federal Land Policy Management Act and the
National Forest Management Act. Both are federal statutes passed in accordance
with Congress’ constitutional power, thus they are the supreme law of the land.”).
112. See, e.g., supra notes 5, 110.
113. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9; BAKER COUNTY, OREGON,
NATURAL RESOURCES PLAN (September 24, 2015) (original version).
114. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 7–8.
115. See supra notes 60–63.
116. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83
Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4337 (2012)).
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consider and protect a county’s codified “custom and culture.” 117
Evidently, Baker County continues to follow that advice, requiring in the
plan that “[a]ny proposed change in land use must evaluate, mitigate, and
minimize impacts to the customs and culture” of Baker County.118 Other
county coordination ordinances begin with similar “custom and culture”
sections.119 These “custom and culture” provisions are vestiges of the
County Supremacy movement.120

117. See Florence Williams, Sagebrush Rebellion II, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS (Feb. 24, 1992), http://www.hcn.org/issues/24.3/sagebrush-rebellion-ii-somerural-countie-seek-to-influence-federal-land-use (quoting the drafter of “custom and
culture” ordinances, attorney Karen Budd, as explaining “NEPA . . . says the
government must use all practicable means to protect our national heritage . . . Most
people think of Indian bones and dinosaurs, but it could be just any use that’s
occurred over long periods of time. Wouldn’t five generations of ranching be a form
of custom and culture?”). The “national heritage” language in NEPA is in
§101(b)(4) of the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4) (“[I]t is the continuing
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent
with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate
Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may. . .
preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage.”).
118. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 15.
119. See, e.g., BIG HORN COUNTY PLAN, supra note 92, at A-14–15;
GRANT COUNTY PLAN, supra note 97, at 5–8; KANE COUNTY PLAN, supra note 91, at
1–4; MALHEUR COUNTY PLAN, supra note 91, at 2-4-4; Pend Oreille Plan, supra note
28, at 6–7; RAVALLI COUNTY RESOLUTION, supra note 91, at 6–7.
120. See Reed, supra note 2, at 550.
The ‘custom and culture’ theory teeters upon the slenderest of
reeds. The National Environmental Policy Act, relied upon by
Ms. Budd as authority, contains in some 350 words of the
introductory declaration of policy, the following as one of six
broad general policy directions: ‘(4) preserve important historic,
cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and
maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports
diversity and variety of individual choice.’ From this paragraph
Ms. Budd has first condensed to ‘historic, cultural, and natural
aspects,’ then gone to Webster's Dictionary to find that ‘culture’
is defined as including ‘customary beliefs’ and then gone to
Bouvier's Law Dictionary (1867 Edition!) to find a definition of
‘custom.’ The Budd syllogism is to take ‘cultural’ out of context,
alter the word to ‘culture,’ find an outdated dictionary that
includes ‘customary’ within a definition of ‘culture’ and then
transmute ‘customary’ to ‘custom.’ Voila! ‘Custom and Culture.’
The result is not statutory construction but creative distortion.
Id.
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The county plan announced its “requirements, needs, and
expectations of federal and state agencies with land-use planning and
decision-making powers within the boundaries of Baker County.” 121
These specifications included the county’s expectation that federal
agencies will coordinate with the county on “all agency planning efforts
and subsequent management decisions.” 122 Moreover, the county
required federal agencies to use “on-the-ground monitoring and trend
data (as opposed to computer modeling and other remotely-collected
data)” to justify changes in federal land use planning.123 The county also
“direct[ed] that all decisions be based on current, relevant, peer reviewed
science and data[.]”124 For federal agencies undertaking NEPA reviews
in Baker County, the county plan required them to make “all practicable
efforts . . . to reconcile inconsistencies of proposed actions” with the
county plan.125 No federal law, however, requires federal land planning
to be consistent with local planning.126
Roads are the first land use addressed in the county plan.127 The
plan required federal agencies to ensure “there will be no net loss” to
public land access in the county, and “[w]here there is no clear and
overriding reason to close a particular road, it shall remain open.” 128
Further, the county plan declared that “Revised Statute (RS) 2477 rightsof-way, will be enacted at appropriate areas.” 129 The county plan
121. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 9.
122. Id. at 11 (the plan stated “it is the express expectation of the County
that federal and state agencies will give the County early notification of forthcoming
decision-making and extend an early invitation to the County to participate in joint
planning and consultation.”).
123. Id. at 14 (the county demanded that “federal and state agencies shall
routinely solicit input and data from authoritative regional sources including Baker
County.”).
124. Id. at 2.
125. Id. at 12 (where consistency is not possible, “Baker County expects
that the federal agency shall engage with the County in conflict resolution and work
with the County to mitigate any residual impacts to the County and its citizens.”).
126. See supra notes 77 (Forest Service regulations), 81, 86 (FLPMA
regulations).
127. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 18.
128. Id. at 18.
129. Id. R.S. 2477 is the common term for an 1866 law that gave a broad
grant of right-of-ways “for the construction of highways over public lands.’ Act of
July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251 (codified at R.S. 2477, recodified at 43
U.S.C. § 932 (2012)). FLPMA repealed the law in 1976, subject to “valid existing
rights.” Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2793 (1976). Therefore, a county
bears the burden of proving to a court that contemporary R.S. 2477 right-of-ways
were constructed before 1976 and have been used in the same way—without
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required that “roads accessing grazing allotments, water developments,
mining claims, foraging sites and other authorized land uses shall remain
open.” 130 These provisions suggest that the county has complete
authority to regulate travel routes across public lands.
The county plan addressed public lands grazing by proclaiming
that “grazing on federal and state allotments and leases shall continue at
historical stocking rates.”131 The plan dictated a three-part test, which it
claimed to impose on federal agencies before reducing grazing intensity
to address range health. 132 These provisions are almost certainly
unconstitutional under conflict preemption principles.133
The county plan sought to dictate increased logging on public
lands,134 stipulating that “[o]n public lands, all tree mortality caused by
forest fire and pests shall be harvested before additional loss of economic
value occurs, in coordination with the Baker County Board of
Commissioners.”135 According to the county plan, the “County’s forest
resources must be governed in the best interests of local citizens while

abandonment—since 1976. See, e.g., S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425
F.3d 735, 768–84 (10th Cir. 2005) (the burden of proof is on party asserting the
right-of-way, describing factors that inform validity of claimed road and ruling that
courts must decide validity of right-of-way, not agencies).
130. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 19.
131. Id. at 21.
132. See id. at 21–22 (“In the event that range health standards on a
permit or lease are not being met, stocking rates will be reduced only in the event
that; 1) failure to meet range health standards is established on the basis of current,
on-the-ground monitoring data; 2) failure to meet range health standards is shown to
be caused by current, as opposed to historic, livestock management practices; and 3)
all adaptive management approaches have been exhausted.”). The county’s plan
would give federal range managers the discretion to reduce grazing levels only if
current livestock management is harming the range. See id. at 22 (“[I]f failure to
meet rangeland health standards is not due to current livestock management,
stocking rates shall not be diminished and season of use will not be curtailed.”)
(emphasis added). The plan would also require the agency to allow the harmful
amount of grazing to resume as soon as the range health rebounds. See id. (“When
range health returns to acceptable levels, suspended [animal unit months] shall be
returned to active use by the next grazing season.”).
133. See infra notes 232–235 (explaining these provisions are conflict
preempted).
134. See BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 25 (“Forest management
practices on public land within Baker County shall include a stable timberharvesting program, which is essential to maintain healthy forest ecosystems and to
provide employment and economic security to individuals and businesses in Baker
County.”).
135. Id. at 27.
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promoting the health of the forests.” 136 These provisions suggest that
local needs are superior to the needs of other public land users, when in
fact, all Americans hold an equal claim of ownership to federal land.
The county plan claimed that all public lands traditionally open
to mineral exploration must remain open to mining.137 The county plan
also required federal land plans to include discussion of the “economic
importance” of mining to Baker County.138 Further, the Baker County
plan announced that “mineral development and production are not
subject to unreasonable stipulations, Best Management Practices,
mitigation measures, or reclamation bonds.”139 Before federal agencies
may withdraw public lands from mining, the plan required federal
agencies to consider and disclose the economic effects of mineral
withdrawal to Baker County’s economy. 140 Like the timber resource
provisions, 141 the county’s stance on mining assumes that federal
agencies must maximize natural resource production on public lands to
benefit local residents.
Baker County’s plan opposed a variety of federal land
management designations, including wilderness designation, 142 and
required that “[m]anagement of lands with wilderness characteristics
shall be coordinated with Baker County.” 143 Likewise, the county
opposed federal Wild and Scenic river designations within the county
and appeared to require federal agencies to co-manage those rivers with
the county board of commissioners.144 The county is similarly opposed

136. Id. at 25.
137. Id. at 30 (“Federal lands historically open for mineral access in
Baker County shall remain open and all proposed road closures shall be coordinated
with Baker County.”).
138. Id. at 30 (“The economic importance of exploration, development
and production of locatable mineral resources shall be incorporated into all federal
management agencies land and resource management plans.”).
139. Id. at 31 (emphasis omitted).
140. See id. at 31 (“Prior to initiating the administrative withdrawal of
public lands from mineral entry, the agency shall carefully take into account and
document for the record; 1) the impacts to rural communities affected by the
withdrawal; 2) the economic value of the mineral resources foregone; 3) the
economic value of the resources being protected, and; 4) an evaluation of the risk
that the renewable resources within the minerals surface use [sic] regulations.”).
141. See supra notes 134–136.
142. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 34.
143. Id. at 34.
144. See id. at 35 (“Any existing or established Wild and Scenic River
occurring within Baker County shall be managed by the designating federal agency
in coordination with Baker County.”).
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to national monuments145 as well as a multitude of other special land use
designations.146
The county assumed an imperious stance on some issues,
declaring, for example, that “Baker County shall direct the US Forest
Service, Bureau of Land Management, [sic] other relevant public
agencies to manage the watershed, including the municipal watersheds,
to meet the multiple needs of residents and promote healthy forests.”147
The plan discouraged establishing instream flows meant to improve
water quality and wildlife habitat.148 It also required federal agencies to
incorporate local fire association plans into federal fire control plans149
and asserted that whenever “grazing on public lands is temporarily
suspended due to fire, grazing shall recommence on the basis of case-bycase monitoring and site-specific rangeland health determinations, as
opposed to fixed timelines.”150 The county plan seemed to assume that
the county government has plenary authority to control land use
decision-making on federal public lands.
The Baker County Natural Resources Plan aimed to affect nearly
every aspect of federal land planning. The plan employed mandatory
language at length, suggesting to its constituents that the coordination
provisions of FLPMA and NFMA give the county board of
commissioners great power over federal land planning and management
decisions. These suggestions are erroneous interpretations of the
county’s role in federal law.151
V. ANALYZING THE COORDINATION ORDINANCES
Federal law allows some local regulation on federal land. In
1987, the Supreme Court issued a landmark opinion on federal
preemption, land planning, and environmental regulation in California
Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co., which upheld state
145. See id. (“Baker County oppose [sic] the use of the Antiquities Act
for designation of National Monuments.”).
146. See id. (expressing county opposition to “National Conservation
Areas, National Research Areas, National Recreation Areas, Outstanding Forest
Areas, Outstanding Natural Areas, Cooperative Management and Protection Areas,
Headwaters Forest Reserves, National Historic Trails and National Scenic Trails”).
147. Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 40 (“It is Baker County policy that in-stream transfers will be
discouraged through conserved water transfers, instream leases and/or purchases if
the upstream users are negatively impacted from the historic beneficial use.”).
149. Id. at 46.
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. See infra Section V (addressing the constitutionality of the Baker
County plan under field preemption and conflict preemption analyses).
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environmental regulation of miners on national forests. 152 This Part
examines the Granite Rock decision and subsequent case law 153 to
consider the extent of permissible local control over land use on federal
land. Using the Baker County, Oregon Natural Resources Plan as an
archetypical coordination ordinance, it addresses the county plan under
the preemption analysis outlined in Granite Rock:154
[S]tate law can be pre-empted in either of two general
ways. If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given
field, any state law falling within that field is preempted. If Congress has not entirely displaced state
regulation over the matter in question, state law is still
pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal
law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both
state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress[.]155
This Part demonstrates that federal law preempts the Baker County plan.
A. County Plans and Field Preemption
In Granite Rock, the Supreme Court presumed that the federal
government has exclusive authority to conduct land use planning on
federal lands.156 The Court distinguished environmental regulation from
land use planning, 157 and in the years following Granite Rock, courts

152. 480 U.S. 572, 594 (1987).
153. See, e.g., Bohmker v. State, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1164 (D. Or.
2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-35262 (state moratorium on motorized instreammining not preempted because the law was a reasonable environmental regulation);
People v. Rinehart, 377 P.3d 818, 829–30 (Cal. 2016) (state may restrict certain
mining techniques on public lands to protect other resources).
154. The county plan is not expressly preempted because neither NFMA,
FLPMA, nor agency regulations explicitly state that federal land plans preempt state
plans.
155. Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 581 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). This
same preemption analysis applies to county ordinances. Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v.
Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (“[F]or the purposes of the
Supremacy Clause, the constitutionality of local ordinances is analyzed in the same
way as that of state laws.”).
156. See infra notes 169–170 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 163–165 and accompanying text.
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have upheld state and local authority over public lands where the state
and local bodies exercised environmental regulation authority. 158 The
county coordination ordinances, however, are not framed as
environmental regulations. Instead, they operate as land planning
directives, which the Supreme Court would consider unenforceable
under field preemption.159
In Granite Rock, the California legislature enacted
environmental regulations for mining operations in the coastal zone.160
At the time California adopted the law, the Granite Rock mining
company already operated under a federally-approved plan of operations
in the Los Padres National Forest. 161 When the state instructed the
company to apply for a state resource protection permit, Granite Rock
filed for an injunction in federal court, arguing the Mining Act of 1872
preempted state environmental regulations on public land.162
158. See infra notes 184–199 and accompanying text.
159. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation &
Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (“Absent explicit preemptive language,
Congress' intent to supersede state law altogether may be found from a ‘scheme of
federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room to supplement it,’ ‘because the Act of Congress may touch a field in which
the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”).
160. Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 576.
161. Id. Granite Rock submitted its five-year plan of operations to the
Forest Service in 1980. Id. In 1981, the Forest Service completed its NEPA
analysis and approved the company’s plan of operations, and Granite Rock began
mining. Id. In 1983, the California law requiring a state environmental permit went
into effect, and Granite Rock filed suit against the state. Id. at 576–77. Granite
Rock did not apply for a state permit, and continued its operations. Id. at 578. By
the time the Supreme Court issued its opinion in 1987, Granite Rock’s plan of
operations had expired. Id. at 577–78.
162. Id. at 577. The plaintiffs in Granite Rock relied on the Ninth
Circuit’s holding in Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp. for the rule that states do not
hold “veto power” over federally authorized activities. See Granite Rock Co. v. Cal.
Coastal Comm’n, 590 F. Supp. 1361, 1372–73 (N.D. Cal. 1984). In Ventura
County, the Ninth Circuit considered a county ordinance prohibiting oil exploration
without a county permit in open space zoning areas. 601 F.2d 1080, 1082 (9th Cir.
1979), aff’d without opinion, 445 U.S. 947 (1980). The court ruled that the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act of 1920 conflict-preempted the county ordinance, id. at 1083,
explaining “[t]he federal Government has authorized a specific use of federal lands,
and Ventura cannot prohibit that use, either temporarily or permanently, in an
attempt to substitute its judgment for that of Congress.” Id. at 1084 (emphasis
added).
Professor Leshy pondered why the Supreme Court never cited Ventura
County in its Granite Rock analysis, declaring “Ventura’s continuing viability
remains at best a puzzle.” John D. Leshy, Granite Rock and the States’ Influence
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In Granite Rock, the Supreme Court distinguished Congress’s
authority over land use planning from its environmental regulatory
powers on public land.163 The Court reasoned that land use planning and
environmental regulation are distinct,164 explaining, “[l]and use planning
in essence chooses particular uses for the land; environmental regulation,
at its core, does not mandate particular uses of the land but requires only
that, however the land is used, damage to the environment is kept within
prescribed limits.”165 The Supreme Court viewed the California permit
requirement as a permissible environmental regulation, 166 ruling on
conflict preemption grounds that federal law did not preempt the state’s
resource protection permit requirements because (1) neither the Mining
Act of 1872 nor Forest Service regulations demonstrated congressional
intent to preempt state environmental laws; (2) the state environmental
regulation did not ban land uses allowed by the federal government; and
(3) the federal Coastal Zone Management Act167 of 1972 authorized state
regulatory authority in the geographic area of Granite Rock’s mine.168
The Granite Rock decision presumed federal law preempted state
land planning for federal lands.169 Indeed, every Justice on the Granite
Over Federal Land Use, 18 ENVTL. L. 99, 109–11 (1987). Leshy suggested the
Court’s decision in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981),
“seriously undermined if not destroyed Ventura County’s precedential value.”
Leshy, supra note 162, at 118. Today, Professors Coggins and Glicksman believe
the Ventura County opinion “probably is no longer good law.” GEORGE C. COGGINS
& ROBERT D. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 5-32 n.3
(Thomson/West 2d ed., 2007).
163. See Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 581 (“We agree with Granite Rock
that the Property Clause gives Congress plenary power to legislate the use of the
federal land on which Granite Rock holds its unpatented mining claim. The question
in this case, however, is whether Congress has enacted legislation respecting this
federal land that would pre-empt any requirement that Granite Rock obtain a
California Coastal Commission permit.” (emphasis added)).
164. See id. at 588 (“Congress’[s] treatment of environmental regulation
and land use planning as generally distinguishable calls for this Court to treat them
as distinct, until an actual overlap between the two is demonstrated in a particular
case.”).
165. Id. at 587.
166. Id. at 585–89.
167. Pub L. No. 109-58, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1451–1465 (2012)).
168. Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 589–93.
169. Id. at 585 (“For purposes of this discussion and without deciding
this issue, we may assume that the combination of the NFMA and the FLPMA preempts the extension of state land use plans onto unpatented mining claims in
national forest lands.”); Id. at 593 (remarking that “federal land use statutes and
regulations [arguably express] an intent to pre-empt state land use planning”).
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Rock Court—which split 5-4 on the validity of the state’s permit
requirement—would have ruled that federal law preempted state land use
planning for federal lands.170 Where the Justices disagreed was on the
issue of whether California’s permit requiring environmental protection
measures infringed on federal land planning.171 The Baker County plan
evinced no intent to serve as an environmental regulation. Instead, it was
framed entirely as a strategy for public land management in Baker
County. 172 In NFMA and FLPMA, Congress granted land planning
authority to federal agencies,173 and the coordination ordinances infringe
on this field of federal regulatory authority.174
After Granite Rock, lower courts refined the extent to which
state environmental regulation could burden Congress’s discretion to
regulate public land uses. In these cases, the courts uniformly viewed the
state or local law in question as environmental regulations, which raised
conflict (but not field) preemption issues. 175 Thus, cases following
Granite Rock have yet to explore the Supreme Court’s suggestion in
Granite Rock that federal law occupies the field of federal land planning,
thereby preempting all state or local land planning for public lands.
A good example of a court following Granite Rock is South
Dakota Mining Association v. Lawrence County, involving a county170. See id. at 585 (O’Connor, J. writing for the majority) (“[W]e may
assume that the combination of the NFMA and the FLPMA pre-empts the extension
of state land use plans onto unpatented mining claims in national forest lands.”); Id.
at 600–01( Powell & Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Justice
Powell’s dissent from the majority’s distinction between land use planning and
environmental regulation, arguing that both are preempted by federal authority over
public lands); Id. at 607–08 (Scalia & White, JJ., dissenting) (Justice Scalia’s
dissent, arguing the California law “is plainly a land use statute, and the permit that
statute requires Granite Rock to obtain is a land use control device. . . . Since, as the
Court's opinion quite correctly assumes. . . . state exercise of land use authority over
federal lands is pre-empted by federal law, California's permit requirement must be
invalid.”).
171. See id.; see also id. at 596 (Powell & Stevens, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“FLPMA only requires the Secretary to listen to the States,
not obey them.”).
172. See, e.g., supra notes 128 (road management generally), 130 (roads
accessing economically productive areas), 131 (grazing rates), 135 (timber harvest),
139 (mineral development), 150 (post-fire range management).
173. See supra Section III (discussing federal land use planning under
NFMA and FLPMA).
174. See Granite Rock, 480 U.S at 589 (“If the Federal Government
occupied the field of environmental regulation of unpatented mining claims in
national forests . . . state environmental regulation of Granite Rock's mining activity
would be pre-empted.”).
175. See infra notes 181, 189, 190, 198, and 208.
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enacted ordinance that prohibited new permits for surface metal mining
in much of the Black Hills National Forest.176 Because surface mining
was the only profitable technique for local miners, the ordinance
functioned as a de facto ban on all mining in the area.177 When mining
companies sued the county, claiming federal law preempted the mining
ban,178 the county argued the ordinance was “a reasonable environmental
regulation of mining on federal lands.” 179 Like the Supreme Court in
Granite Rock, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
suggested that federal land use planning occupied the field of authority to
manage public lands.180 But because the county law interfered with only
one federal statute, the Eighth Circuit applied the conflict preemption
analysis from Granite Rock,181 reasoning that “[t]he ordinance’s de facto
ban on mining on federal land acts as a clear obstacle to the
accomplishment of the Congressional purposes and objectives embodied
in the Mining Act.” 182 Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s ruling that the county law was unenforceable under
conflict preemption.183
The decisions in Granite Rock and South Dakota Mining
Association led a federal district court to decide that federal law did not
preempt a state moratorium on motorized mining in riparian areas.184 In
Bohmker v. State, the Oregon legislature passed a seven-year ban on
using motorized equipment to mine riverbeds and banks to protect water
quality and salmon habitat.185 However, unlike the ordinance in South
Dakota Mining Association, the Oregon law allowed miners to continue
using restricted mechanized equipment outside of protected stream areas,
as well as non-motorized techniques inside the regulated river
176. 155 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 1998).
177. Id. at 1007.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1009.
180. See id. at 1011 (“A local government cannot prohibit a lawful use of
the sovereign's land that the superior sovereign itself permits and encourages. To do
so offends both the Property Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the federal
Constitution.”); Id. (acknowledging that in Granite Rock, “the Court first assumed
without deciding that state land use regulations, which [the Court] defined as laws
‘that in essence choose[] particular uses of land,’ were preempted.”).
181. Id. at 1009–12.
182. Id. at 1011.
183. S.D. Mining Ass’n v. Lawrence Cnty., 997 F. Supp. 1396, 1405–06
(D.S.D. 1997) (“[T]his Court holds that federal law, specifically the Mining Act of
1872 preempts local law.”), aff’d, 155 F.3d at 1011 (“The district court correctly
ruled that the ordinance was preempted.”).
184. Bohmker v. State, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1164–65 (D. Or. 2016).
185. Id. at 1159–60.
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corridors.186 Like Granite Rock and South Dakota Mining Association,187
the Bohmker court distinguished land planning from environmental
regulation. 188 Relying on Granite Rock, the court held that the
moratorium was “a reasonable environmental regulation” because the
measure aimed to protect fish, wildlife, water quality, and tribal use.189
Under Bohmker, a narrowly tailored, temporally limited restriction of
one mining technique in specific areas—intended to protect the
environment—is not a “land use law” preempted by NFMA or
FLPMA.190
Under Granite Rock, states may influence which activities are
allowable on public land by imposing environmental protection
conditions not required by the Forest Service or BLM. 191 A recent
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 1164–65.
See supra notes 163–165, 180.
See Bohmker, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1164.

[T]he [Granite Rock] Court found that land use planning and
environmental regulation, while theoretically could overlap in
some cases, are distinct activities, capable of differentiation.
‘Land use planning in essence chooses particular uses for the
land; environmental regulation, at its core, does not mandate
particular uses of the land but requires only that, however the land
is used, damage to the environment is kept within prescribed
limits.’ Because the [Granite Rock] Court found that the stated
purpose of the California permitting scheme was to regulate
environmental effects, not regulate land use, the Court did not
reach a decision on the merits of federal land use preemption.
Similarly, the stated purpose of [the mining ban in Bohmker] is to
regulate the environmental impacts of the prohibited activity—in
this case, motorized instream mining.
Id. (citations omitted).
189. Id. at 1163–64.
190. Id. at 1163–64 (reviewing the Supreme Court’s language in Granite
Rock that state land plans for national forest lands would be preempted by federal
regulations and holding that federal regulations did not preempt the Oregon
moratorium because the state law “does not mandate particular uses of the land, nor
does it prohibit all mining altogether.”). Similarly, in Pringle v. Oregon, a federal
district court upheld Oregon’s ban on recreational suction dredge mining within
scenic waterways because the state allowed all other methods of recreational mining
in the protected areas. No. 2:3-CV-00309, 2014 WL 795328, at *7–8 (D. Or. 2014)
(rejecting a miner’s argument that the Oregon law operated like the de facto ban on
mining struck down in South Dakota Mining Association).
191. Granite Rock and subsequent cases have not determined what state
or local laws constitute an impermissible land plan because in all of these cases the
courts considered the validity of the contested state laws as environmental
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decision by the Supreme Court of California concerning suction dredge
mining is illustrative. In People v. Rinehart, the court unanimously held
that the state could prohibit suction dredge mining on public lands to
protect other natural resources.192 The defendant miner argued that the
banned mining technique was the only profitable method of mining.193
Citing South Dakota Mining Association,194 the defendant asserted the
state law amounted to a de facto ban on mining and was therefore
preempted by the Mining Law of 1872. 195 But the California court
distinguished the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in South Dakota Mining
Association, explaining, “Congress could have made express that it
viewed mining as the highest and best use of federal land wherever
minerals were found or could have delegated to federal agencies
exclusive authority to issue permits and make accommodations between
mining and other purposes.” 196 However, it did neither, so the court
reasoned that federal mining law required miners to comply with state
law, 197 ruling that the state’s ban on suction dredge mining was not
preempted because federal law did not guarantee miners “a right to mine
immunized from exercises of the states’ police powers.” 198 Like the

regulations. See supra notes 166, 179, 189, and infra note 206. However, in Granite
Rock the Supreme Court provided some guidance as to the difference between
permissible environmental regulations and impermissible land use laws:
The line between environmental regulation and land use planning
will not always be bright; for example, one may hypothesize a
state environmental regulation so severe that a particular land use
would become commercially impracticable. However, the core
activity described by each phrase is undoubtedly different. Land
use planning in essence chooses particular uses for the land;
environmental regulation, at its core, does not mandate particular
uses of the land but requires only that, however the land is used,
damage to the environment is kept within prescribed limits.
California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 587 (1987)
(emphasis added).
192. 377 P.3d 818, 829–30 (Cal. 2016).
193. Id. at 820.
194. Id. at 829–30.
195. Id. at 823–24.
196. Id. at 830.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 820.
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cases before it, Rinehart recognized a state’s authority to regulate lawful
uses of public lands in order to protect the environment.199
Taken together, these cases demonstrate that states and counties
have sufficient authority to require environmental protection measures
for public land users. But with the exception provisions in the Baker
County plan encouraging efforts to combat invasive species on public
lands and address erosion issues,200 the county plan makes no effort to
operate as an environmental regulation. Indeed, every other provision in
the county plan is less environmentally protective than the federal
agency’s requirements. 201 Unlike the laws in Granite Rock and
subsequent cases, the Baker County plan functions as a public land
management plan, not a reasonable environmental regulation. Therefore,
the county plan is field preempted by the federal government’s authority
to regulate public lands under NFMA and FLPMA, and serves only as an
unenforceable policy statement.
B. County Plans and Conflict Preemption
In Granite Rock and ensuing cases, courts applied a conflict
preemption analysis to state and county regulations that burdened legal
uses of public land. The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that
“[i]f Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter
in question, state law is still pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts
with federal law[.]”202 Thus, even if the Baker County plan and other
coordination ordinances were not field preempted by NFMA and
199. See id. at 829 (“The federal statutory scheme does not prevent states
from restricting the use of particular mining techniques based on their assessment of
the collateral consequences for other resources.”).
200. See BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 28–29 (encouraging
“early detection, rapid response and follow-up monitoring” to combat invasive and
noxious species in Baker County); Id. at 41 (“Federal agencies shall work in
partnership with permittees and other land managers on riparian management to
ensure that monitoring data are current, and potential issues regarding stream bank
erosion, channel depth, etc. are addressed early through adaptive management
approaches.”).
201. See supra Section IV.B. (describing county demands and positions
on public land management issues), Section V.B. (discussing conflicts between the
county plan and federal statutes).
202. California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 581
(1987) (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added). This same preemption analysis applies to county
ordinances. Hillsborough Cnty, Fla. v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
713 (1985) (“[F]or the purposes of the Supremacy Clause, the constitutionality of
local ordinances is analyzed in the same way as that of state laws.”).
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FLPMA, the coordination ordinances are still unconstitutional under the
Supremacy Clause if the county plans conflict with federal law.
Several conflict preemption cases are illustrative. In Kleppe v.
New Mexico, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that a federal law
protecting wild horses and burros preempted a state’s traditional
authority to manage wildlife on public lands.203 The Court affirmed state
authority to regulate civil and criminal issues on public lands but
explained that when Congress enacts public lands legislation, “the
federal legislation necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the
Supremacy Clause.” 204 Consequently, in Granite Rock, the Supreme
Court found no conflict between federal environmental laws and the state
environmental permit requirement.205
None of the Granite Rock line of cases decided whether counties
(as opposed to states) may require environmental protection measures on
federal lands. 206 However, in Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary
County., the Idaho Supreme Court considered the validity of a county
ordinance that required all federal and state land use planning to conform

203.
204.

426 U.S. 529, 545–46 (1976).
Id. at 543. The Court continued:

The Federal Government does not assert exclusive jurisdiction
over the public lands in New Mexico, and the State is free to
enforce its criminal and civil laws on those lands. But where
those state laws conflict with the Wild Free-roaming Horses and
Burros Act, or with other legislation passed pursuant to the
Property Clause, the law is clear: The state laws must recede.
Id.
205. See supra notes 166–168.
206. In South Dakota Mining Association, Lawrence County argued its
ban on new mining permits was a reasonable environmental regulation, permissible
under Granite Rock. S.D. Mining Ass’n v. Lawrence Cnty., 155 F.3d 1005, 1009
(8th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Circuit, however, refused to view the law as a
reasonable environmental regulation. See id. at 1011 (“[U]nlike Granite Rock, we
are not faced with a local permit law that sets out reasonable environmental
regulations governing mining activities on federal lands. The ordinance’s de facto
ban on mining on federal land acts as a clear obstacle to the accomplishment of the
Congressional purposes and objectives embodied in the Mining Act.”). Thus,
although the court ruled that the Lawrence County ordinance was not a valid
environmental regulation, the court did not suggest that counties cannot require
environmental regulation on public lands.
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to a county land use plan. 207 The court ruled the entire plan
unconstitutional under conflict preemption.208
The county plan in Boundary Backpackers was quite similar to
the Baker County plan, purporting to require federal agencies to obtain
county permission before designating federal wild and scenic rivers,
adjusting federal land boundaries, or revising federal land plans within
the county.209 The ordinance also required federal and state agencies to
coordinate with the county board of commissioners prior to taking action
that might affect the county’s plan.210 Similarly, the Baker County plan
requires federal agencies to partner with Baker County commissioners in
harvesting timber211 or managing wild and scenic rivers.212
The Idaho Supreme Court surveyed numerous federal statutes
that conflicted with the local plan’s requirements for federal land
management. 213 For example, the county plan prohibited federal
agencies from acquiring property rights in the county without ensuring
“parity in land ownership,” but the court explained that requirement
conflicted with provisions in the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and
FLPMA authorizing federal land acquisitions. 214 The court noted
conflicts between the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and provisions in
the county plan requiring federal agencies to receive county concurrence

207. Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary Cnty., 913 P.2d 1141, 1143–44
(Idaho 1995).
208. Id. at 1147–48.
209. Id. at 1144.
210. Id. at 1143–44. The Boundary County plan appears to have defined
“coordination” as compliance with the county plan. See id. at 1143 (quoting from
the plan: “Federal and state agencies proposing actions that will impact [the plan]
shall prepare and submit in writing, and in a timely manner, report(s) on the
purposes, objectives and estimated impacts of such actions, including economic, to
[the board]. These report(s) shall be provided to [the board] for review and
coordination prior to federal or state initiation of action.”) (emphasis added); see
also id. at 1144 (quoting from the plan: “Any federally proposed designation of Wild
and Scenic Rivers and all federal policies regarding riparian management in
Boundary County shall be coordinated with [the board] and shall comply with any
County water use plan.”) (emphasis added).
211. See supra note 135.
212. See supra note 144.
213. Boundary Backpackers, 913 P.2d at 1147–48 (reasoning that
various provisions of the county plan conflicted with the Multiple-Use SustainedYield Act of 1960, the Wilderness Act, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, the Forest
and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1976, the Endangered Species
Act, and FLPMA).
214. Id. at 1147.
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on changes to land use plans and wildlife habitat designations.215 The
county plan also conflicted with procedures in the Wilderness Act for the
designation of federal wilderness areas. 216 Consequently, the court
declared the ordinance unenforceable under conflict preemption, citing
Granite Rock,217 explaining “[n]one of the federal land laws give local
governmental units . . . veto power over decisions by federal agencies
charged with managing federal land.” 218 Even though the county
ordinance in Boundary Backpackers contained a severability clause 219
similar to the Baker County plan,220 the court ruled that the plan was
unconstitutional in its entirety.221
Like the ordinance in Boundary Backpackers, the Baker County
plan is permeated with provisions that conflict with federal land laws.
For instance, the plan requires federal agencies to not acquire or
condemn private property.222 This provision conflicts with FLPMA and
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which allow the
federal government to acquire interests in private property by purchase,
exchange, or eminent domain.223 The Baker County plan also requires
federal agencies to consider Baker County’s “custom and culture” and
local economy in developing recovery efforts under the Endangered
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1146.
218. Id. at 1147.
219. Id. at 1148.
220. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 3 (“Should a court declare
any part of these policies void, unenforceable, or invalid, the remaining provisions
shall remain in full force and effect.”).
221. See Boundary Backpackers, 913 P.2d at 1148 (“Despite the obvious
intent of the board to preserve the remainder of the ordinance if portions are declared
unconstitutional, the portions of the ordinance that are preempted by federal law are
so integral and indispensable to the ordinance, we conclude the entire ordinance
must fall.”).
222. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 13 (“Baker County is
dedicated to preserving [private property interests on public lands], and expects that
federal agencies shall not attempt to terminate, or otherwise demand the transfer or
relinquishment of, such holdings in whole or in part from private individuals.”). The
ordinance struck down in Boundary Backpackers contained a similar provision. See
supra note 214.
223. See 43 U.S.C. § 1715(a) (2012) (“[T]he Secretary, with respect to
the public lands and the Secretary of Agriculture, with respect to the acquisition of
access over non-Federal lands to units of the National Forest System, are authorized
to acquire pursuant to this Act by purchase, exchange, donation, or eminent domain,
lands or interests therein.”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (recognizing the sovereign power
of the federal government to take private property for public use if it provides just
compensation).
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Species Act, 224 and to mitigate the effects of ESA listings on Baker
County’s economy. 225 Congress did not require either of these
considerations in the ESA; actually, the statute requires the government’s
recovery plans to give priority to aiding species that are imperiled by
economic activity like development.226
The Baker County plan would allow seemingly unregulated
mining on federal lands. The county plan announced that “[i]t is the
policy of Baker County that mineral development and production are not
subject to unreasonable stipulations, Best Management Practices,
mitigation measures or reclamation bonds.” 227 However, federal law
grants the Forest Service and BLM considerable authority to approve or
disapprove mining plans and to require bonds or mitigation measures.228
Thus, the county ordinance clashes with Congress’s directives to the
Forest Service and BLM about managing mineral lands as well as the
agencies’ interpretation of this authority to regulate mining.
The county plan also conflicts with federal law on national
monuments, grazing regulation, and alternative energy siting. The
Antiquities Act authorizes the President to establish national monuments
on federal lands,229 but the Baker County plan “opposes the designation
of any National Monument within its borders unless the proposal is
coordinated with the County and is strongly supported by the local
community.” 230 In FLPMA, Congress granted the Forest Service and
BLM the authority to decide grazing closures,231 but the Baker County
224. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 36.
225. Id. at 37.
226. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(A) (2012).
227. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 31 (emphasis omitted).
228. See 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (“In managing the public lands the
Secretary shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent
unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.”); 43 C.F.R. § 3809.1–900 (2017)
(requiring bonds, plans of operations, reclamation plans, mitigation, and other
criteria for mining on BLM lands); 16 U.S.C. § 478 (2012) (“[Miners] must comply
with the rules and regulations covering such national forests.”); 16 U.S.C. § 551
(2012) (granting the Secretary of Agriculture authority to regulate the occupancy and
use of national forests, and to protect them from destruction); 36 C.F.R. § 228.1–15
(2017) (requiring bonds, plans of operations, reclamation plans, mitigation, and other
criteria for mining on Forest Service lands).
229. 54 U.S.C. § 320301 (2012); see, e.g., Santa Rosa and San Jacinto
Mountains National Monument Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-351, 114 Stat. 1362
(2000) (codified at 16 U.S.C. 431 (2012)); Tulare County v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1138,
1144 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (affirming district court’s dismissal of challenge to President’s
authority to designate monuments).
230. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 35.
231. 43 U.S.C. § 1752(a) (2012).
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plan requires land managers to satisfy a three-part test before reducing
grazing pressure to improve range health. 232 FLPMA allows the
Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture to grant rights-of-way for energy
production on public land,233 but the county plan proclaims “[e]xcept for
geothermal development, there will be no development of any alternative
energy sources on forestland.”234 The county’s position on all of these
public land management issues frustrates the purpose of federal law by
attempting to establish public land policies different than Congress
requires. Therefore, under Granite Rock, the Supreme Court would
likely find the Baker County Natural Resources Plan unenforceable
under conflict preemption.235
Under Granite Rock and conflict preemption principles, neither
states nor counties may impose management directives conflicting with
federal law. In South Dakota Mining Association, the Eighth Circuit
ruled that a county ordinance was void under conflict preemption where
the ordinance conflicted with one federal statute. 236 Here, the Baker
County plan conflicts with numerous federal statutes, much like the
county ordinance the Idaho Supreme Court ruled unenforceable in
Boundary Backpackers.237 Thus, even supposing NFMA, FLPMA, and
Granite Rock do not field-preempt coordination ordinances like the
Baker County plan,238 federal law preempts the Baker County plan under
conflict-preemption. On most public lands issues, the Baker County plan
is singularly pro-development, and therefore contrary to agency
regulations, land plans, and statutory directives.

232. See supra note 132.
233. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761–1770.
234. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 24. The plan explains the
county’s position as “due to the site disturbance and road building for most types of
energy projects.” Id.
235. See California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572,
581 (1987) (“If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter
in question, state law is still pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal
law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or
where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.”) (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,
248 (1984)) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). This same preemption
analysis applies to county ordinances. Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med.
Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (“[F]or the purposes of the Supremacy Clause,
the constitutionality of local ordinances is analyzed in the same way as that of state
laws.”).
236. See supra notes 181–183.
237. See supra notes 207–221.
238. See supra Section V.A.

BLUMM PROOF (Do Not Delete)

2017

9/24/2017 4:28 AM

“COORDINATING” WITH THE FEDERAL GOV’T

49

VI. WHAT CAN COUNTIES ACTUALLY DO?
Under NFMA, FLPMA, and agency regulations, county
governments can play an important role in federal land management
decisions. In the existing legal framework, the federal government
encourages local governments to share local perspectives and partner
with agencies in finding solutions to land management issues. 239
Coordination ordinances announcing local sentiment on public lands
management may serve this purpose.
The problem with coordination ordinances like the Baker County
plan is that county commissioners seem to believe their ordinances lay
the foundation for negotiation with federal agencies. Although federal
law invites county governments to come to the table ready to teach,
learn, or explore management options,240 the Baker County plan is rigid
and inflexible on virtually every aspect of federal land use. Counties
have the opportunity to help shape land management decisions because
federal land managers often have discretion in land planning. 241
Unfortunately, coordination ordinances like the Baker County plan
squander the opportunity to effectively influence public land planning by
taking positions directly contrary to what Congress has required in
natural resources statutes.
Federal law encourages counties to be proactive in engaging
their local land managers on public lands issues. Nearly twenty-five
years ago, an attorney for Harney County, Oregon242 advised the county
239. See supra Section IV.
240. See supra Section III (describing the statutory and regulatory
meaning of “coordination” under NFMA and FLPMA).
241. In 1993, Judge Dale White of Harney County, Oregon, requested
attorney Ronald S. Yockim to review a Harney County ordinance that asserted
authority to manage federal lands. See Memorandum from Ronald S. Yockim,
Attorney, to Judge Dale White, Harney Cnty. Court (Dec. 31, 1993). Yockim
advised:
[A] local government drafting regulations with respect to federal
lands should give careful attention to whether preemption has
occurred and to what degree the land manager still retains any
discretion to act. It is in those areas where the action has been left
to the discretion of the land manager that the county would have
the most ability to influence federal land management practices.
Id.
242. Harney County is home to the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge,
which the Bundy occupiers seized in January 2016. See supra notes 3–4; see also
Michael C. Blumm & Olivier Jamin, The Property Clause and Its Discontents:
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government, “[i]f the counties intend to play an effective role in public
land management then we recommend that they become involved early
in the planning process, raise consistency issues early, understand their
own statutory limitations, and provide the federal agencies with clear
statements as to priorities.”243 This advice remains true today. The best
way for counties to influence federal land planning and management
decisions is, as Professor Michelle Bryan has argued, to learn about the
relevant processes and get involved early.244
For example, the Malheur Wildlife Refuge Comprehensive
Conservation Plan (“CCP”) 245 was the result of highly collaborative
planning efforts between federal and local parties.246 In October 2016,
participants in the planning effort for the Malheur refuge—including
ranchers, birdwatchers, and federal land managers—convened at a
conference in Bend, Oregon, to describe their unique partnership. 247
Lessons From the Malheur Refuge Occupation, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. at 16–18
(reviewing the Bundy occupation of the Malheur refuge and the group’s
constitutional arguments) (forthcoming 2017), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract
=2817205.
243. Id.
244. See Michelle Bryan, Learning Both Directions: How Better
Federal-Local Land Use Collaboration Can Quiet the Call for Federal Land
Transfers, 76 MONT. L. REV. 147, 153–54 (2015) (calling for federal agencies and
local governments to “establish ongoing relationships that operate outside of any
short-term planning process.”); Michelle Bryan, Cause for Rebellion? Examining
How Federal Land Management Agencies & Local Governments Collaborate on
Land Use Planning, 6 J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 1, 16 (2015) (local government
officials “must become well educated about federal planning to take full advantage
of the process.”).
245. The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service administers National Wildlife
Refuges, see supra note 72, but the principle of early local involvement in the
planning process applies to all federal land management agencies.
246. See Jane Braxton Little, Irony of Malheur Refuge Occupation Seen
in Collaboration Over Federal Land, SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 4, 2016),
http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/california-forum/article118385208.html (“The site
the Bundy brothers and their cowboy cohorts chose to showcase government abuse
is home to the High Desert Partnership, a diverse group of ranchers, federal agency
scientists and environmentalists representing more than 30 organizations. The
partnership, which began with familiar exasperation over federal management, has
evolved beyond the refuge in eastern Oregon.”); Les Zaitz, $6 Million Will Go to
Restore Malheur Refuge, Cover Other Costs of Standoff, THE OREGONIAN (Mar. 23,
2016),
http://www.oregonlive.com/oregon-standoff/2016/03/repairs_to_malheur_
refuge_will.html (“Gary Marshall, a longtime local rancher and chairman of the
High Desert Partnership, said years of work by diverse groups arrived at a plan for
the refuge that accounts for all needs, from environmental to economic.”).
247. Oregon Natural Desert Association, Desert Conference: Public
Lands, Common Ground Brings Diverse Voices to Bend October 14, ONDA.ORG
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Participants described the importance of building personal relationships
with other stakeholders, getting involved in the planning process early,
and encouraging federal employees like refuge managers to remain in the
community long-term. 248 The process used to formulate the Malheur
Refuge plan deserves emulation. If the counties with coordination
ordinances seek a “bottom-up” approach to land management decisions,
they must engage in the sometimes-tedious federal land planning
processes and prepare to adapt to changing situations, economies, and
pressures on public land resources.
The authority counties claim to possess in their coordination
ordinances is, under federal law, reserved for Indian tribes, which
possess a special trust relationship with the federal government. 249
Whereas tribes are expressly mentioned in the Constitution,250 counties
are constitutionally insignificant. Executive orders and presidential
memorandums have required federal agencies to grant special
consultation and government-to-government negotiations to tribes. 251
Under BLM’s short-lived Planning 2.0 regulations,252 BLM committed to
“initiate consultation with Indian tribes on a government-to-government
basis during the preparation and amendment of resource management
plans.”253 Many tribes have treaties with the United States, but county

(Sept. 16, 2016), https://onda.org/pressroom/press-releases/desert-conference-publiclands-common-ground-brings-diverse-voices-to-bend-october-14.
248. Id.
249. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 554–61 (1832) (elaborating
the special trust relationship between federal government and Indian tribes); see,
e.g., Leigh Paterson, Tribal Consultation at Heart of Pipeline Fight, INSIDE ENERGY
(Sept. 23, 2016), http://insideenergy.org/2016/09/23/tribal-consultation-at-heart-ofpipeline-fight/ (explaining federal agencies’ consultation with tribes in the Standing
Rock and Dakota Access pipeline controversy).
250. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Indian Commerce Clause).
251. See Memorandum on Tribal Consultation, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,881,
57,881 (Nov. 5, 2009) (charging federal agencies “with engaging in regular and
meaningful consultation and collaboration with tribal officials in the development of
Federal policies that have tribal implications, and . . . strengthening the governmentto-government relationship between the United States and Indian tribes.”); Exec.
Order 13,175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, 65
Fed. Reg. 67,249, 67,249–50 (Nov. 6, 2000) (granting tribes opportunities for
consultation, “government-to-government” collaboration, and administrative
discretion).
252. See supra note 85 (reviewing changes to BLM’s FLPMA
regulations that went into effect January 2017, but were rescinded in March 2017).
253. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–1 (2017). This provision in FLPMA regulations
is new in 2017, as the previous version 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3 did not require
government-to-government consultation with tribes. See supra note 85 (discussing
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governments have no authority to demand government-to-government
negotiations with the federal government.
Counties have no special standing under federal law. For
example, under FLPMA’s regulations, BLM retains great discretion in
achieving consistency between federal plans and county plans, 254
explaining the objectives of coordination as paying attention to and
considering local plans, suggestions, and public involvement.255 FLPMA
contains no requirement of “government-to-government” consultation
with counties. Nor does the statute require federal decisions to be
consistent with local plans.256
Even if federal government had the resources to grant
"government-to-government" status to local governments—hardly
clear—why should it? Doing so would promote monopolization of
resource use by giving special status to local plans, thereby elevating
those controlling local government—no doubt local economic leaders—
great control over public lands at the expense of all the other owners of
federal public lands.257 The vast majority of American citizens do not
live close to lands they own that would be effectively monopolized by
local control. Indeed, many Americans live so far away from western
public lands that their ability to exercise their ownership share is
materially diminished by that distance. The “public” in public land law
has generally implicitly favored the local as opposed to the regional or
national publics.258 Giving government-to-governmental special status to

the revised FLPMA regulations and new provision regarding consultation with
Indian tribes).
254. See 81 Fed. Reg. 89,580, 89,618–19 (Dec. 12, 2016) (quoting the
2016 and Planning 2.0 “Consistency requirements” FLPMA regulations and
explaining the differences therein).
255. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
256. See OWYHEE CNTY., IDAHO, 179 IBLA 18, 28–33 (2010) (FLPMA
does not require BLM’s travel management plans to be consistent with county
ordinances or resolutions on off-highway vehicle use, and BLM fulfilled its
obligation to coordinate by maintaining communication with county government).
257. For an argument that public participation in public land planning
requires the land manager to bring together representatives of all legitimate interests
to work out acceptable comprises, see Owen Olpin, Toward Jeffersonian
Governance of Public Lands, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 959 (1994). Giving special
status to local governments would not be consistent with this paradigm.
258. See, e.g., Joseph M. Feller, Ride ‘Em Cowboy: A Critical Look at
BLM’s Proposed Grazing Regulations, 34 ENVTL. L. 1123, 1140–42 (2004)
(describing one way BLM proposed changing grazing regulations to “exclude nonranchers from management decisions and stall implementation of environmental
standards.”).
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local county plans would exacerbate this already unbalanced view of the
relevant public in public land law.
Changes to the FLPMA planning regulations may occur despite
the terms of the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”), which Congress
invoked to rescind BLM’s 2.0 planning regulations, 259 and include a
provision ostensibly prohibiting agencies from drafting new regulations
on the same topic as regulations rescinded under the CRA. 260
Nonetheless, on March 27, 2017, Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke
directed BLM’s Acting Director to “immediately begin a focused effort
to identify and implement results-oriented improvements to [the
agency’s] land use planning and NEPA processes.”261 Secretary Zinke’s
memorandum directed BLM to evaluate how “a new rulemaking” 262
could address numerous criteria, including “the needs of state and local
governments.” 263 In early May 2017, Secretary Zinke suspended
meetings of BLM’s resource advisory councils as part of a review of
advisory councils throughout the Interior Department,264 suggesting that
any new planning rules may take some time, particularly in light of the
fact that Secretary Zinke is also reviewing the propriety of the
designation of some twenty-seven national monuments proclaimed over
the past twenty years.265
VII. CONCLUSION
County governments and people living near public lands hold
legitimate and useful perspectives on federal lands management. NFMA
and FLPMA require federal agencies to consider these viewpoints. On
some issues, federal law grants local residents special authority to inform
259. See supra note 85.
260. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2) (2012) (“A rule that does not take effect
(or does not continue) under paragraph (1) may not be reissued in substantially the
same form, and a new rule that is substantially the same as such a rule may not be
issued, unless the reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted
after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the original rule.”).
261. Memorandum from Ryan Zinke, Sec’y, Department of the Interior,
to Acting Dir., BLM, (Mar. 27, 2017), available at https://www.eenews.net/assets/
2017/04/18/document_pm_01.pdf.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See Scott Streater, Agency suspends advisory panels even as
decisions loom, GREENWIRE (E & E News) (May 5, 2017), available at https://www.
eenews.net/stories/1060054139.
265. See Jennifer Yacknin, National Monuments: Final review list
includes Maine, Colo. Sites, GREENWIRE (E & E News) (May 8, 2017), available at
https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2017/05/08/stories/1060054205.
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management decisions on public lands. 266 However, the coordination
provisions in NFMA and FLPMA do not require the federal government
to engage in government-to-government consultation or negotiations
with counties in making public land management decisions. Special
interest groups like ALEC, the Public Lands Council, and American
Stewards of Liberty have misled county governments into asserting an
authority that does not exist in federal law. Coordination ordinances like
the Baker County Natural Resources Plan are preempted and
unenforceable under the Supremacy Clause.
Under the Supreme Court’s Granite Rock decision, states and
counties may enact reasonable environmental regulations regarding uses
of public land allowed by the federal government. As a representative
coordination ordinance, the Baker County plan is—at most—an
unenforceable policy statement. Although counties lack authority to
usurp or control federal land planning, county governments can play a
valuable role if they work collaboratively with federal land managers to
help make informed decisions. 267 If county plans operate as starting
points from which county governments work towards cooperative land
management solutions, the plans may become useful components of
federal public land planning.268 But county plans have no constitutional
266. In NRDC v. Hodel, a federal district court rejected BLM regulations
that gave ranchers the authority to make range management decisions because the
Taylor Grazing Act, FLPMA, and Public Rangelands Improvement Act required
federal agencies to manage public lands. 618 F. Supp. 848, 868–71 (E.D. Cal.
1985). The agency proceeded to revise its regulations to allow local participation
through “resource advisory councils,” which require representation by local
communities. See 43 C.F.R. § 1784.6-1 (2017); 60 Fed. Reg. 9,958, 9,896 (Feb 22,
1995) (explaining the three groups from which RAC members are selected,
including representatives of grazing interests and local governments). However, the
unlawful delegation doctrine limits agency authority to grant decision-making
authority to local entities. See, e.g., Nat’l Park & Conservation Ass’n v. Stanton, 54
F. Supp. 2d 7, 18–21 (D.D.C. 1999) (the National Park Service violated the unlawful
delegation doctrine by conveying its management and decision-making
responsibilities for wild and scenic river to local council).
267. See supra note 244.
268. Reflecting on the Sagebrush Rebellion in 1982, Governor of
Arizona Bruce Babbitt opined:
Both the states and the federal government share a common trust:
the public good. They ought to be collaborators rather than
adversaries. By working toward a truly cooperative regime of
public land management, they may improve both the public
welfare and the health of the intergovernmental system.
See Babbitt, supra note 56, at 861.
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authority to control management of federal lands that are owned by all of
the American public, not just local county residents.

